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CRIMINAL DOCTRINES OF FAITH 
DAVID JAROS* 
Abstract: Decisions like Miranda v. Arizona helped popularize a conception 
of the courts as a protector of criminal defendants and a bulwark against over-
ly aggressive law enforcement. But from arrest through trial, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has fashioned criminal constitutional procedure with a deep and 
abiding faith in the motivations of the criminal justice system’s actors. Even 
decisions that vindicate individual constitutional rights at the expense of po-
lice and prosecutorial power are shaped by the Court’s fundamental trust in 
those same actors. They establish, in essence, “Criminal Doctrines of Faith.” 
Criminal Doctrines of Faith pervade each stage of the criminal process—from 
cases that govern the pursuit of suspects and searches of homes to the disclo-
sure of exculpatory evidence and the defendant’s capacity to waive a jury trial. 
This faith in law enforcement takes several forms. Some decisions reflect a 
simple faith in the character of police and prosecutors, but others reflect faith 
in the institutions in which they work or in the courts’ ability to identify and 
deter misconduct. Recent high-profile prosecutions of police officers have 
highlighted and raised new questions about how much criminal procedure 
should rest on faith. In such cases, trusted government actors, both police and 
prosecutors, have attacked the integrity of a criminal process ostensibly de-
signed to control their own behavior. Using the trials of the Baltimore police 
officers charged in the death of Freddie Gray as a lens, this Article highlights 
how the Supreme Court’s faith in police and prosecutors raises profound ques-
tions about the strength of these doctrines, the importance of more skeptical 
and diverse viewpoints on courts, and the viability of court-led regulation of 
law enforcement actors. 
INTRODUCTION 
When Maryland’s State Attorney, Marilyn Mosby declared that she 
had filed criminal charges against the six Baltimore police officers she be-
lieved were responsible for the death of Freddie Gray, a bitter and often 
rancorous public debate immediately commenced over the propriety of her 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2018, David Jaros. All rights reserved. 
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. Thanks are due for 
insightful comments and conversations with Josh Bowers, Doug Colbert, Brandon Garrett, Rachel 
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2018] Criminal Doctrines of Faith 2205 
actions, the guilt of the officers, and the manner in which poor minority 
communities were being policed across the United States.1 Yet, despite 
widespread division over nearly every aspect of these cases, advocates on 
both sides were united in one critical respect: each expressed their lack of 
confidence in the capacity of the criminal justice system to fairly and accu-
rately resolve the cases.2 
The shared distrust of the legal system to mete out justice raised im-
portant questions about the legitimacy and the integrity of important politi-
cal institutions.3 But there was also a notable irony in the Freddie Gray cas-
es. Although participants on both sides expressed a lack of faith in the sys-
tem’s ability to resolve the cases fairly, the legal issues and the ultimate out-
come of the cases were shaped by criminal doctrines that were predicated 
on the Supreme Court’s faith in that same system and its actors. 
Some constitutional doctrines are premised on a historical understand-
ing of a particular constitutional provision.4 Others are shaped by the text 
itself.5 Scholars have debated the import of a comma and its impact on the 
scope of the federal courts’ jurisdiction.6 Debates over the meaning of the 
Second Amendment have focused on the framers’ interest in militias and 
their concern (or lack thereof) in individuals’ personal right to own fire-
arms.7 What was striking about the trials of the officers charged in the death 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., Charlotte Alter, Baltimore Cops to Face Charges in Freddie Gray Case, TIME 
(May 1, 2015), http://time.com/3843342/freddie-gray-charges-police-baltimore/ [https://perma.cc/
4R33-45FL] (describing community responses both supporting and condemning the decision to 
charge the officers); Editorial, The Lessons of Baltimore, and Ferguson, and Too Many Places, L.A. 
TIMES (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-baltimore-20150429-
story.html [https://perma.cc/S4Z5-GZ74]. Freddie Gray was a young African-American Baltimore 
man who was fatally injured while shackled in the back of a police van. See infra notes 21–39 and 
accompanying text. 
 2 See Lauryn P. Gouldin, Redefining Reasonable Seizures, 93 DENV. L. REV. 53, 55–56 
(2015) (describing protests born out of the death of Freddie Gray and several other highly publi-
cized deaths of black men that highlighted skepticism in heavily policed communities that the 
judiciary would reign in the reach of the police); Alter, supra note 1 (including statements by the 
lawyer for the Baltimore police union, who expressed skepticism about the fairness of the charges 
against the officers). 
3 See Gouldin, supra note 2, at 56 (discussing the impact of the protests). 
 4 R. Randall Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation and the Four Main Approaches to 
Constitutional Interpretation in American Legal History, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 121, 128 (1994). 
 5 Id. 
 6 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers 
of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 217 n.50 (1985) (“[T]he comma after ‘fact’ clearly 
implies that the ‘exceptions’ power applies to appellate jurisdiction generally and not simply to 
facts.”). 
 7 Kenneth Lasson, Blunderbuss Scholarship: Perverting the Original Intent and Plain Mean-
ing of the Second Amendment, 32 U. BALT. L. REV. 127, 130 (2003) (“From a strictly historical 
perspective, however, the overwhelming weight of available evidence demonstrates that the pri-
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of Freddie Gray was the number of legal issues that were resolved by doc-
trines, based not on history or text, but rather on the Supreme Court’s pre-
sumption that police and prosecutors are to be trusted. 
While decisions like Mapp v. Ohio and Miranda v. Arizona popular-
ized a conception of the Supreme Court as a protector of criminal defend-
ants and a bulwark against overly aggressive law enforcement,8 scholars 
have long criticized the Court for its tendency to side with the government 
in criminal procedure cases.9 Such scholars have noted the Court’s reluc-
tance to impede effective criminal investigations, the justices’ penchant for 
asserting dubious factual claims about the nature of policing, and their will-
ingness to defer to police “expertise.”10 The Court has been equally solici-
tous of prosecutors. Prosecutors, it has found, must be afforded absolute 
immunity so that they can act with “courage and independence.”11 The 
Court has presumed repeatedly that “the government attorney in a criminal 
prosecution is not an ordinary party to a controversy, but a servant of the 
                                                                                                                           
mary concern of the Founding Fathers was the concept of a militia—as distinguished from a 
standing federal army—not the right of each individual citizen to own firearms.”). 
 8 See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 765 (2012) (“But 
whatever else the Court can be said to have done, it allocated wholesale the responsibility for 
solving the problem of policing to courts and promoted the regulation of the police primarily by 
constitutional adjudication.”); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 781, 791–92 (2006) (“When the Supreme Court constitutionalized criminal 
procedure in the 1960s the conventional wisdom, evidently shared by the Justices, held that elect-
ed legislators would never adequately protect the interests of criminal suspects and defendants.”). 
See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (creating a prophylactic rule to protect the 
Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) 
(extending from federal to state courts the exclusionary rule as a remedy for a Fourth Amendment 
violation). 
 9 See, e.g., John Michael Harlow, California v. Acevedo: The Ominous March of a Loyal 
Foot Soldier, 52 LA. L. REV. 1205, 1263 (1992) (describing the Court’s increasing deference to 
law enforcement); Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless Policing: Technology and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 199, 200–01 (2007) (“Ever since the Warren Court’s revolution in crimi-
nal procedure, numerous decisions have imposed constitutional constraints on the police, yet none 
of them curb police discretion to any meaningful degree.” (footnote omitted)); David A. Sklansky, 
Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 
271, 273 (arguing that, between 1996 and 1997, the Supreme Court’s decisions in four cases relat-
ed to vehicle stops “strongly favor law enforcement”). 
 10 See Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
1995, 1997–98 (2017) (noting the Court’s command for deference to law enforcement); Sklansky, 
supra note 9, at 324 (“The judiciary, moreover, has shied away from detailed regulation of police 
officers’ use of force, partly because it fears hampering law enforcement . . . .”); Seth W. Stough-
ton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 848–49, 851 (2014) (arguing that the Court has based a 
number of criminal procedure decisions on inaccurate assumptions about policing). 
 11 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422–23 (1976) (quoting Pearson v. Reed, 44 P.2d 592, 
597 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935)); see Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (“In this 
instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest 
officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.”). 
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law.”12 In Singer v. United States, the Court held that prosecutors need not 
articulate their reasons for refusing to allow a defendant to waive a jury, 
proclaiming its “confidence in the integrity of the federal prosecutor” when 
it rejected the idea that “prosecutors would demand a jury trial for an igno-
ble purpose.”13 
Yet, perhaps because the Court’s rulings at times vindicate defendants’ 
rights and restrict prosecutorial and police activity14 and at other times grant 
criminal justice actors broad license to act,15 the Court’s failure to assess 
accurately either the nature of the government’s actions or the ramifications 
of its rulings is generally regarded as a discrete failure in appreciating the 
specifics of the case rather than a bias that favors one side over the other.16 
A closer analysis of the Court’s decisions, however, reveals that crimi-
nal constitutional procedure is fashioned with a deep and abiding faith in 
the motivations of criminal justice system actors.17 Even those decisions 
that vindicate individual constitutional rights at the expense of police and 
prosecutorial power are shaped by the Court’s fundamental belief that po-
lice and prosecutors can be trusted. This Article suggests that the Court’s 
abiding faith in the criminal justice system in the face of the deep distrust 
exhibited by both supporters and detractors of the prosecution of the offic-
ers charged in the death of Freddie Gray is not merely ironic. On the contra-
ry, the Court’s holdings that are premised on its faith in the criminal justice 
system raise profound questions about the strength of those precedents, the 
importance of diverse viewpoints on the Court, and the viability of court-led 
regulation of police and prosecutors. 
Part I of this Article explores several key Supreme Court decisions that 
played pivotal roles in the cases against the officers charged in the death of 
Freddie Gray and identifies how those decisions are founded, either explic-
itly or implicitly, on trusting the motivations and actions of police and pros-
                                                                                                                           
 12 Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 37 (1965) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Berger 
v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). 
 13 Id. at 37. 
 14 See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (forbidding the prosecution to with-
hold favorable evidence from the defendant); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (prohibiting the use in state 
courts of evidence obtained by the police in violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
 15 See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that traffic stops are 
valid regardless of the subjective motivations of the investigating officers, so long as the officers 
have probable cause to make the stop); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 987 (1984) (adopting 
the “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule). 
 16 See, e.g., Stoughton, supra note 10, at 852 (discussing how the Court’s reliance on inaccu-
rate facts also leads to faulty rulings). 
 17 Although this Article speaks of the Court’s “faith” in police and prosecutors, this terminol-
ogy is not to suggest that all nine Justices share identical views or that no case exists in which the 
majority decision adopted a skeptical view of how police and prosecutors behave. 
2208 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2203 
ecutors.18 Part II delves deeper into the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure 
jurisprudence and identifies three potential sources of faith for the doctrines 
established by those cases: faith in police and prosecutors’ character, faith in 
the institutions in which they work, and faith in the courts’ ability to identi-
fy and deter misconduct.19 Part III considers three questions: (1) whether 
“Criminal Doctrines of Faith” are particularly vulnerable to narrowing by 
lower courts; (2) what these cases suggest about the value of diverse view-
points on the federal bench; and, (3) what the courts’ reliance on the good 
intentions of police and prosecutors means for the viability of court-led reg-
ulation of police and prosecutors.20 
I. CRIMINAL DOCTRINES OF FAITH AND THE FREDDIE GRAY TRIALS 
A. The Death of Freddie Gray 
When twenty-five-year-old Freddie Gray saw Lieutenant Brian Rice at 
8:39 a.m. on a bright spring April morning, he made a fatal error—he ran.21 
Had Mr. Gray lived in nearby Roland Park, an affluent neighborhood a few 
miles north, Officer Rice would have lacked the authority to order his fel-
low bike officers, Edward Nero and Garrett Miller, to pursue and seize Mr. 
Gray.22 Unfortunately, the Sandtown-Winchester neighborhood of North-
West Baltimore where Freddie Gray grew up suffered from one of the high-
est crime rates in the city.23 As a result, Mr. Gray’s decision to avoid police 
contact was not an exercise of his right to “ignore the police presence and 
                                                                                                                           
18 See infra notes 21–148 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 149–211 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 212–282 and accompanying text. 
 21 See Kevin Rector, The 45-minute Mystery of Freddie Gray’s Death, BALT. SUN (Apr. 25, 
2015), http://data.baltimoresun.com/freddie-gray/ [https://perma.cc/5EJP-BPXE] (describing Freddie 
Gray’s encounter with police on April 12, 2015). 
 22 See id. (explaining the officers’ justifications for pursuing Mr. Gray included that “he ran . . . 
in an area known for drug dealing[]”); see also Christopher Corbett, Baltimore’s Truth in Freddie 
Gray’s Death, REUTERS: THE GREAT DEBATE (Apr. 28. 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-
debate/2015/04/28/the-baltimore-truth-in-freddie-grays-life-and-death/ [https://perma.cc/A9NB-
98UF] (describing the dichotomy between Roland Park in North Baltimore and West Baltimore 
where Mr. Gray lived). 
 23 See Adam Marton & Emma Patti Harris, Graphic: Sandtown-Winchester Neighborhood 




average-in-most-factors-20150430-htmlstory.html] (ranking Baltimore neighborhoods based on 
criteria such as the rate of non-fatal shootings and homicides). 
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go about his business.”24 Instead, it gave the police the license they needed 
to chase him down, forcibly subdue him, and search him for weapons.25 
When their search uncovered a knife that allegedly violated a city ordi-
nance, the officers were legally authorized to place Mr. Gray under arrest.26 
Although questions remain to this day as to how and when Mr. Gray 
ultimately received his fatal injury, the immediate aftermath of Mr. Gray’s 
arrest was caught on camera.27 After being forcibly subdued and held face 
down on the pavement with his legs bent backwards in a “leg lace” hold, 
Mr. Gray complained loudly and his screams of pain brought out the resi-
dents of the Gilmor Homes public housing complex where Mr. Gray had 
grown up.28 One of those residents, Kevin Moore, filmed Mr. Gray being 
dragged screaming to a Baltimore Police Transport Wagon with his hands 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (citation omitted) (“[W]hen an officer, 
without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a 
right to ignore the police and go about his business.” (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 
(1983))). 
 25 See id. at 124 (concluding that “unprovoked flight” in a “high crime area” constitutes “rea-
sonable suspicion” justifying a suspect’s temporary detention). 
 26 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 421, 424 (1976) (upholding the validity of a 
warrantless arrest based upon probable cause); Justin Fenton, Video Shows Officer Operating the 
Knife Recovered from Freddie Gray, BALT. SUN (Oct. 31, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/
news/maryland/investigations/bs-md-ci-freddie-gray-knife-video-20161028-story.html [https://
web.archive.org/web/20171108032736/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/investigatio
ns/bs-md-ci-freddie-gray-knife-video-20161028-story.html] (describing the knife Mr. Gray was 
carrying as possibly illegal under a decades-old ordinance). But see William A. Schroeder, War-
rantless Misdemeanor Arrests and the Fourth Amendment, 58 MO. L. REV. 771, 826–27, 828 
n.233 (1993) (observing that, although most states allow police to make warrantless arrests on 
probable cause for misdemeanors committed in the arresting officer’s presence, the Supreme 
Court has never explicitly endorsed the practice). 
 27 See generally Rector, supra note 21 (indicating points in time when Mr. Gray’s condition 
was unknown). 
 28 Colin Campbell, Man Critically Injured in Videotaped Baltimore Police Encounter, BALT. 
SUN (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-ci-gilmor-homes-
arrest-20150413-story.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20180712015352/http://www.baltimore
sun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-ci-gilmor-homes-arrest-20150413-story.html]; Karl Merton 
Ferron, Investigating the Freddie Gray Case, BALT. SUN, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/
maryland/baltimore-city/bal-behind-the-scenes-baltimore-police-investi-002-photo.html [https://
perma.cc/JN9D-V653]; Justin George, Exclusive Look Inside the Freddie Gray Investigation, 
BALT. SUN (May 2, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/sun-investigates/bs-md-
ci-freddie-gray-investigation-20150502-story.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20180712014601/
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/sun-investigates/bs-md-ci-freddie-gray-investigation-
20150502-story.html]; Eyder Peralta, Timeline: What We Know About the Freddie Gray Arrest, 
NPR: THE TWO-WAY (May 1, 2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/05/01/4036
29104/baltimore-protests-what-we-know-about-the-freddie-gray-arrest [https://perma.cc/9GNM-
XTRQ]; Rector, supra note 21. 
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cuffed behind his back.29 After the rear doors were closed by the driver, Of-
ficer Caesar Goodson, the van swayed back and forth as Mr. Gray continued 
to protest his detention from the inside of the vehicle.30 
At trial, the prosecution would contest the defendants’ claim that they 
were forced to make a hurried exit from Gilmor Homes in the face of an 
increasingly hostile crowd.31 Regardless of the reason, the van driver was 
ordered to leave the area for Central Booking.32 Moments later, however, 
Lieutenant Rice ordered Officer Goodson to pull over so that officers could 
meet the van and place Mr. Gray in additional constraints.33 As a result, Mr. 
Gray was subsequently removed from the van and placed in leg shackles.34 
The officers later testified that the uncooperative Mr. Gray was then carried 
back inside the van and placed face down on the metal floor with his ankles 
shackled together and his arms handcuffed behind his back.35 
Exactly what happened next remains a mystery to this day. Approxi-
mately forty minutes after Mr. Gray was initially loaded into the police van, 
he arrived at the Western District police station “unresponsive” and in “se-
rious medical distress,” having sustained a spinal injury in the course of his 
ride that proved to be fatal a week later.36 The graphic video of Mr. Gray’s 
arrest and his subsequent death sparked widespread civil protests and riot-
                                                                                                                           
 29 Kevin Richardson, Man Who Shot Freddie Gray Arrest Video, ‘I Finally Made a Difference,’ 
BALT. SUN (May 1, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/videos/83439379-132.html [https://web.
archive.org/web/20180712022211/http://www.baltimoresun.com/videos/83439379-132.html]. 
 30 See Juliet Linderman, In Trial Over Prisoner’s Death, Seat Belt Policy Is Examined, 
WASH. TIMES (May 17, 2016), https://go.shr.lc/2NImNhS [https://perma.cc/X5GL-UENL] (de-
scribing testimony that the van was shaking back and forth). 
 31 Donna Owens, Baltimore Police Lieutenant Acquitted in Freddie Gray Case, REUTERS 
(July 18, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-baltimore-police/baltimore-police-lieutenant-
acquitted-in-freddie-gray-case-idUSKCN0ZY0YP [https://perma.cc/4P9T-QUX9]. 




htmlstory.html]; Timeline: Freddie Gray’s Arrest, Death and the Aftermath, BALT. SUN, http://
data.baltimoresun.com/news/freddie-gray/ [https://perma.cc/VA7L-AUM9]. 
 33 Marton & Harris, supra note 32; Timeline: Freddie Gray’s Arrest, Death and the After-
math, supra note 32. 
 34 Rector, supra note 21; Timeline: Freddie Gray’s Arrest, Death and the Aftermath, supra 
note 32. 
 35 Peralta, supra note 28. 
 36 Meredith Cohn, Medical Professionals Will Try to Determine How Gray’s Neck Was Injured, 
BALT. SUN (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/health/bs-hs-freddie-gray-medical-
20150427-story.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20180712020909/http://www.baltimoresun.com/
health/bs-hs-freddie-gray-medical-20150427-story.html]. 
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ing in the streets of Baltimore, prompting the Governor to order the Nation-
al Guard to secure the city.37 
Anger over Mr. Gray’s death was fueled, in part, by widespread stories 
that Baltimore police officers punished difficult arrestees by giving them 
“rough rides,” a practice in which officers deliberately drive erratically so 
as to throw unsecured detainees around the van and cause them injury.38 It 
was in this context that the Baltimore State’s Attorney, Marilyn Mosby, took 
to the steps of the Baltimore War Memorial across from City Hall and pub-
lically announced that her office was pursuing criminal charges against six 
of the officers who had been involved in the arrest, transport, and death of 
Mr. Gray.39 
B. Trials and Errors: Three Instances of Criminal Doctrines of Faith 
The trials of the officers charged in Freddie Gray’s death received sub-
stantial public attention and contributed to a nationwide debate over police 
involved deaths, racial justice, and the policing of poor minority communi-
ties.40 Yet, rather than resolve what happened to Freddie Gray and restore 
faith in the criminal justice system, the trials served to further polarize pub-
lic opinion and raise doubts about the actions of not only the defendant po-
lice officers, but also the officers who investigated the cases and the prose-
cutors who brought the charges.41 When the prosecution finally dismissed 
the remaining cases without securing a single conviction, the Baltimore 
State’s Attorney, Marilyn Mosby, excoriated the police and declared that 
department investigators had sabotaged the State’s case in a successful ef-
fort to protect their own.42 Across town, police union officials and the offic-
                                                                                                                           
 37 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Baltimore Enlists National Guard and a Curfew to Fight Riots and 
Looting, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2m88WqB [https://perma.cc/FK67-FNGZ]. 
 38 Doug Donovan, Proving ‘Rough Ride’ in Court Is Difficult, Police and Legal Experts Say, 
BALT. SUN (June 23, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-
rough-rides-20160623-story.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20180712021455/http://www.
baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-rough-rides-20160623-story.html]. 
 39 George, supra note 28. 
 40 See, e.g., Haeyoun Park & Jasmine C. Lee, Looking for Accountability in Police-Involved 
Deaths of Blacks, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2jS8ESr [https://perma.cc/A7FH-
CWRL] (describing the nationwide protests and policy debates ignited by high profile police in-
volved deaths). 
 41 Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jess Bidgood, All Charges Dropped Against Baltimore Officers in 
Freddie Gray Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/us/charges-
dropped-against-3-remaining-officers-in-freddie-gray-case.html [https://perma.cc/RTF5-MQMU].  
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ers’ attorneys publically maintained that the acquittals vindicated their claims 
that the charges against the officers had been politically motivated and that 
the State’s Attorney had deliberately ignored exculpatory evidence.43 
The deep distrust and hostility between the police and the city’s chief 
prosecutor appeared to reflect national divisions over police misconduct and 
racial justice.44 But three key moments in the trials involved Criminal Doc-
trines of Faith—doctrines which presumed that both the police and prosecu-
tors could be trusted. 
1. Illinois v. Wardlow and the Alleged Assault of Freddie Gray by Bike 
Patrol Officers 
Freddie Gray’s decision to run when he saw Lieutenant Brian Rice not 
only led directly to his death, it also critically undermined the State’s case 
against the officers involved in his detention and arrest.45 A police officer 
cannot detain an individual, even temporarily, if the officer lacks a reasona-
bly articulable suspicion that “criminal activity may be afoot.”46 Moreover, 
the courts have recognized that individuals have a right to refuse to speak to 
the police and officers cannot stop a person who deliberately avoids police 
                                                                                                                           
0713024435/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bal-transcript-state-s-
attorney-marilyn-mosby-on-the-dropped-charges-20160727-story.html]. 
 43 See Alter, supra note 1 (presenting the police union’s initial condemnation of the charges as 
beyond the boundaries of the law); Stolberg & Bidgood, supra note 41 (alluding to the political 
ramifications of the trials); Pamela Wood & Wyatt Massey, Baltimore FOP President: ‘Justice 
Has Been Done’ in Dropping Charges Against Police Officers, BALT. SUN (July 27, 2016), http://
www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-charges-dropped-fop-201 [https://web.
archive.org/web/20171114125703/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-
md-charges-dropped-fop-20160727-story.html] (offering the defense’s response to the dropped 
charges). 
 44 See, e.g., Scott Dance, Donald Trump: Marilyn Mosby ‘Should Prosecute Herself,’ BALT. 
SUN (July 27, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bal-donald-trump-
marilyn-mosby-should-prosecute-herself-20160727-story.html [https://web.archive.org/web/2017
1114125703/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bal-donald-trump-marilyn-
mosby-should-prosecute-herself-20160727-story.html] (condemning the prosecutor while cele-
brating the police officers); Nicole Hemmer, Opinion, The Brutality President, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/thomas-jefferson-street/articles/
2017-08-29/donald-trump-is-the-police-brutality-president [https://web.archive.org/web/20180714
030918/https://www.usnews.com/opinion/thomas-jefferson-street/articles/2017-08-29/donald-trump-
is-the-police-brutality-president] (describing President Trump’s implicit endorsement of racial 
profiling and his explicit support for the rough treatment of suspects). 
 45 See, e.g., Transcript: State’s Attorney Marilyn Mosby on the Dropped Charges, supra note 
42 (linking Mr. Gray’s decision to run to his death). 
 46 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (outlining the criteria required for detention). 
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contact.47 Yet while Freddie Gray may have had the right to “walk away” 
from Lieutenant Rice, he did not have the right to run.48 
 In 2000, in Illinois v. Wardlow, Chief Justice William Rehnquist dis-
tinguished the mere refusal to interact with the police from “unprovoked 
flight,” explaining that “unprovoked flight” in a “high crime area” could 
constitute reasonable suspicion sufficient to support the officer’s right to 
forcibly detain a suspect.49 Although the Wardlow decision has been round-
ly criticized for creating disparities between the way that poor communities 
of color and wealthier (typically whiter) communities are policed, Freddie 
Gray’s decision to run from Lieutenant Rice provided the officers with the 
legal justification they needed to pursue and detain him.50 This legal author-
ity would subsequently prove to be a crucial obstacle in the State’s effort to 
convict the three arresting officers of assault.51 
When State’s Attorney Marilyn Mosby initially announced that she 
was filing charges, the three bike officers involved in Mr. Gray’s arrest were 
accused of committing intentional and negligent assault, false imprison-
ment, and misconduct in office.52 Although the “spring assisted knife” that 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Royer, 460 U.S. at 497–98 (“The person approached [by the police] . . . need not answer 
any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his 
way.” (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 32–33 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 34 (White, J., concurring))); 
see also United States v. Sprinkle, 106 F.3d 613, 618 (4th Cir. 1997) (affirming that officers 
lacked “reasonable, articulable suspicion” to stop an individual who sought to hide his face and 
drive away from police at normal speed). 
 48 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 32–33 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining that “ordinarily the person 
addressed has an equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away”). 
 49 Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. 
 50 See id. (finding that defendant’s “unprovoked flight” from officers in area of heavy narcot-
ics trafficking supported reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal activity and 
justified his temporary detention); Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evalu-
ating Stop and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2448 (2017) 
(“Indeed, even setting aside the question of how a ‘high crime area’ is to be identified or bounded, 
Wardlow explicitly subsidizes police activity in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty in com-
parison to wealthy neighborhoods.”); Adam B. Wolf, The Adversity of Race and Place: Fourth 
Amendment Jurisprudence in Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 S. Ct. 673 (2000), 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
711, 715 (2000) (arguing that Wardlow recognizes substantially fewer Fourth Amendment protec-
tions for people of color and indigent citizens than for the wealthy and white); Owens, supra note 
31 (noting that Mr. Gray “fled unprovoked in a high-crime area” and it was this flight that resulted 
in the officers chasing him). 
 51 See Transcript: State’s Attorney Marilyn Mosby on the Dropped Charges, supra note 42 
(explaining the chief prosecutor’s decision to drop the remaining charges in light of not guilty 
verdicts already handed down for other defendants). 
 52 See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-203 (West 2018) (defining statutorily intentional and 
negligent assault); Duncan v. State, 384 A.2d 456, 458 (Md. 1978) (describing the common law 
crime of misconduct); Midgett v. State, 139 A.2d 209, 216 (Md. 1958) (describing the elements of 
the common law charge of false imprisonment); Lori Aratani, Paul Duggan & Dan Morse, Six 
Officers Charged in Death of Freddie Gray, WASH. POST (May 1, 2015), https://www.washington
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the police recovered from Mr. Gray may have been legal under state law, 
unfortunately for the prosecution, the defense was able to point to a city 
ordinance that appeared to ban such weapons.53 As a result, the State’s At-
torney was unable to claim that the police lacked probable cause to hold Mr. 
Gray once the knife was discovered.54 Moreover, despite the graphic video 
of Mr. Gray being dragged screaming to the police van, no additional evi-
dence materialized that suggested that the officers had physically assaulted 
Mr. Gray.55 In fact, the autopsy suggested that the only significant injury 
Mr. Gray received was the blow to the head that effectively severed his 
spine, which both the defense and the prosecution agreed occurred after Mr. 
Gray had been loaded into the van and driven away.56 
As a result, the prosecution was forced to abandon the false imprison-
ment charge and pursue an assault charge premised not on a deliberate beat-
ing, but on the theory that the officers lacked the authority to touch Mr. 
Gray before the knife was recovered.57 Under this theory, any contact the 
officers made with Mr. Gray would constitute an “offensive touching,” 
thereby satisfying the battery element for second degree felony assault.58 
                                                                                                                           
post.com/local/overnight-calm-in-baltimore-as-tensions-remain-and-protests-expected/2015/05/
01/00e07e7a-efe6-11e4-8666-a1d756d0218e_story.html?utm_term=.7344d5a0f75b [https://perma.
cc/Y9XQ-YN5X] (outlining the initial charges). 
 53 Fenton, supra note 26. Although the prosecution abandoned its claim that the knife was 
legal, the question as to whether the ordinance did in fact apply to Mr. Gray’s knife was never 
fully resolved. See id. (explaining the discussion surrounding Mr. Gray’s knife and the ordinance). 
 54 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (“On reason and authority the true 
rule is that if the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause . . . the 
search and seizure are valid.”); Fenton, supra note 26 (discussing the legality of Mr. Gray’s ar-
rest). 
 55 See Rector, supra note 21 (detailing the lack of concrete evidence of a substantial physical 
altercation). 




 57 See Fenton, supra note 26 (discussing the prosecution’s theory that Mr. “Gray was illegally 
detained before the knife was found”); Peter Hermann & Paul Duggan, Six Baltimore Police Of-
ficers Indicted in Death of Freddie Gray, WASH. POST (May 21, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/local/crime/six-baltimore-police-officers-indicted-in-death-of-freddie-gray/2015/05/21/
182f2778-fe1b-11e4-805c-c3f407e5a9e9_story.html?utm_term=.302b7a76c60e [https://perma.
cc/N67M-92KM] (contrasting the indictments to the initial charges). The officers were not indict-
ed on the false imprisonment charges, though it remains unclear whether the grand jury refused to 
indict or whether the State chose not to pursue those charges after reviewing the available evi-
dence. Hermann & Duggan, supra. 
 58 See Claggett v. State, 670 A.2d 1002, 1009 (Md. 1996) (“Battery is commonly defined as a 
harmful, unlawful, or offensive touching. Moreover, the unlawful application of force to another, 
however slight, constitutes a battery.” (citations omitted)). 
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The flaw in the prosecution’s argument was that there was little doubt 
under Wardlow that the officers had the right to pursue and detain Mr. 
Gray.59 There was no question that the area of West Baltimore where Mr. 
Gray was arrested was a “high crime area.”60 In fact, just three weeks prior 
to Mr. Gray’s fatal encounter with the officers, the State’s Attorney had re-
quested that the police target the neighborhood with “enhanced” drug en-
forcement efforts.61 At the close of trial, the prosecution was forced to con-
cede that the police were authorized under Wardlow to pursue and briefly 
detain Mr. Gray when he fled from Lieutenant Rice.62 As a result, the prose-
cution was compelled to argue that Mr. Gray’s lawful detention “morphed” 
into an arrest without probable cause in the three and a half minutes be-
tween his initial seizure and the discovery of the knife.63 In support of this 
argument, the prosecution argued that, by waiting for Lieutenant Rice to 
arrive on the scene rather than radioing for additional information, Officers 
Nero and Miller were not sufficiently diligent in dispelling their “reasonable 
suspicion.”64 
In her closing argument, Assistant State’s Attorney Janice Bledsoe ar-
gued that African-American men in Baltimore are routinely “jacked up” by 
the police and that officers habitually seize suspects without probable cause 
and “throw them up against the wall.”65 Relying on Wardlow, the defense, 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (allowing law enforcement to stop an individual who runs 
away unprovoked in a “high crime area”). 
 60 See Marton & Harris, supra note 23 (comparing certain crime statistics for Sandtown-
Winchester to the Baltimore city average). 
 61 Kevin Rector, Baltimore Prosecutor Asked Police to Target Area Where Freddie Gray Was 
Arrested, BALT. SUN (June 9, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-
ci-mosby-email-20150609-story.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20180808011915/http://www.
baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-ci-mosby-email-20150609-story.html]. 




 63 See Fenton, supra note 26 (discussing the allegedly illegal arrest); David A. Graham, Can 
Prosecutors Convict Anyone at All in the Death of Freddie Gray?, THE ATLANTIC (June 6, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/freddie-gray-caesar-goodson-trial/485792/ 
[https://perma.cc/ENC3-CPAH] (describing the prosecution’s theory). 
 64 See Graham, supra note 63 (elaborating on the prosecution’s interpretation and application of 
Wardlow). Lieutenant Rice was pursuing a second suspect who had been with Mr. Gray and so Of-
ficers Nero and Miller made the arrest. Timeline: Freddie Gray’s Arrest to His Fatal Spinal Cord 
Injury, CBS BALT. (June 23, 2106), https://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2016/06/23/timeline-freddie-
grays-arrest-to-his-fatal-spinal-cord-injury/ [https://perma.cc/X5YJ-58EL]. 
 65 Kevin Rector & Justin Fenton, Prosecutors, Defense Disagree in Closings on What Consti-
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focusing on the specifics of the Gray case, responded that “[b]eing detained 
is a horrible thing, but the law allows this,” and Baltimore Circuit Judge 
Barry G. Williams called the practice “a separate issue.”66 
Ultimately, Judge Williams acquitted Officer Nero, finding that the 
State failed to prove that Nero touched Mr. Gray during the critical interval 
between Gray’s seizure and the discovery of his knife.67 Effectively ham-
strung by the Wardlow decision, the prosecution was unable to demonstrate 
that the police officers’ decision to chase, tackle, and search Mr. Gray vio-
lated the law. 
A closer analysis of Wardlow, however, reveals that the prosecution’s 
observations about police practices were not “a separate issue” but rather 
struck at the foundation of the decision—the Supreme Court’s faith in the 
police. In essence, Wardlow didn’t validate the actions of the police in the 
Freddie Gray cases. Rather, the actions of the police in the Freddie Gray 
cases cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Wardlow decision. 
In Wardlow, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that “[h]eadlong flight 
. . . is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of 
wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.”68 Casually embedded in 
this pronouncement, however, is the presumption that a young African-
American man in a high crime area would not flee the presence of a law 
enforcement officer absent a substantial likelihood that he was engaged in 
criminal activity. Yet if the prosecution’s claim were true—that police offic-
ers regularly jack up young black men without reasonable suspicion, much 
less probable cause—then Chief Justice Rehnquist’s empirical claim be-
comes suspect. 
The fundamental premise of Wardlow is that running from the police is 
indicative of criminal activity.69 If individuals run out of fear of police har-
assment, then the claim that flight in a high crime area supports a finding of 
reasonable suspicion is substantially weaker. In fact, given the likelihood 
that police misconduct occurs at a greater rate in heavily policed high crime 
                                                                                                                           
closing-20160519-story.html]; see Graham, supra note 63 (offering additional claims of brutality 
made by the State’s Attorney). 
 66 See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124; Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 (allowing the police to stop a person 
for investigatory purposes); P. Kenneth Burns, Nero Trial Is Now in Judge’s Hands, WYPR (May 
19, 2016), http://news.wypr.org/post/nero-trial-now-judge-s-hands#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/
2326-YB7E] (providing judge’s response to prosecution’s closing arguments in Officer Nero’s 
trial); Mike Hellgren, Judge in Freddie Gray-Officer Trial Grills Prosecutors, CBS BALT. (May 
19, 2016), http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2016/05/19/edward-nero-trial-closing-arguments [https://
perma.cc/2UTA-96J3] (recapping the closing arguments). 
 67 Transcript of the Verdict Hearing for Officer Edward M. Nero, supra note 62. 
 68 Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. 
 69 Id. 
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areas, it may be that flight from the police in such places is less likely to 
justify a seizure than running in more affluent areas of town where such 
harassment is less frequent.70 
In a report on policing in Baltimore produced by the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) in the wake of Freddie Gray’s death, the DOJ found that Bal-
timore Police Department (BPD) officers “routinely” detained and ques-
tioned individuals who were “sitting, standing, or walking in public areas, 
even where officers ha[d] no basis to suspect them of wrongdoing.”71 Only 
3.7% of the 7200 BPD stops reviewed by the DOJ resulted in either an ar-
rest or even the issuance of a citation.72 Moreover, the DOJ found that Bal-
timore citizens were at times detained and transported to booking facilities 
simply for not having adequate identification on their person, a practice that 
the DOJ noted was unconstitutional even in instances in which the officers 
had reasonable suspicion.73 When one patrol officer protested that he had 
no valid reason to stop and disperse a group of young African-American 
males on a street corner, his sergeant, in the presence of the DOJ observer, 
responded, “[t]hen make something up.”74 
Unjustified detentions were not the only concern outlined in the DOJ 
report that might shake one’s faith in the presumptions undergirding Ward-
low. The report also included instances in which suspects had been subject-
ed to humiliating (and unlawful) public strip searches; unjustified arrests for 
non-criminal activities, such as standing on a public street that bordered 
public property; and overly aggressive police tactics that escalated to physi-
cal assault and other forms of “unreasonable uses of force.”75 The docu-
mented use of these tactics is not to suggest that all officers or even the vast 
majority of officers were regularly breaking the law. If these practices were 
sufficiently widespread to shape the public’s perception of the police, how-
ever, then they would explain why a young man like Freddie Gray would 
                                                                                                                           
 70 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Law Enforcement and Criminal Law Decisions, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 
517, 525 (2001) (“Imagine the next case where the flight occurs in a wealthy, white, suburban 
area. In many ways, flight in those circumstances is even more suspicious than in inner cities 
where there is often great distrust of police officers.”). 
 71 CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 28 (2016) https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download [https://perma.
cc/7SEY-JDDD] [hereinafter BALTIMORE DOJ REPORT]. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. (citing United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 579–80 (5th Cir. 2008)) (noting that the 
holding in Zavala was that a “90-minute detention in which the suspect was handcuffed, placed in 
a police car, and transported to a different location ‘morphed from a Terry detention into a de 
facto arrest’” (citation omitted)). 
 74 Id. at 29. 
 75 Id. at 33–35, 74–80, 91–96. 
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run from an officer, even if criminality were not “afoot.” Indeed, the DOJ 
report described as much, stating that:  
Community members told [the DOJ] in interviews that even when 
they believe they have done nothing wrong, they flee from inter-
actions with officers, believing that it is better to run at the sight 
of an officer rather than take the risk that an interaction with the 
officer will result in unnecessary and excessive force being used 
against them.76 
This critique of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s assumptions in Wardlow is 
not novel.77 Indeed, in his dissent in the same case, Justice John Paul Ste-
vens explained that “[a]mong some citizens, particularly minorities and 
those residing in high crime areas, there is also the possibility that the flee-
ing person is entirely innocent, but, with or without justification, believes 
that contact with the police can itself be dangerous, apart from any criminal 
activity associated with the officer’s sudden presence.”78 Yet, while the an-
ecdotal evidence encapsulated in the DOJ’s report closely mirrors Justice 
Stevens’s view, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s faith in law enforcement ultimate-
ly controlled the outcome of Wardlow and became the prevailing law of the 
land. As a result, even as Freddie Gray’s death sparked a nationwide con-
versation about law enforcement’s actions in poor minority communities, 
the trials of the officers charged in his death were shaped by a doctrine 
based on the assumption that individuals do not run from the police unless 
they are guilty of committing a crime.79 
2. Compelling Testimony: Kastigar v. United States and the Prosecution’s 
Grant of Limited Use Immunity 
The first officer to stand trial was Officer William Porter.80 Porter re-
sponded to the van driver’s request for additional support at the van’s sub-
sequent stops.81 The prosecution alleged that Officer Porter had ignored 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Id. at 79. 
 77 See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that running from the po-
lice could stem from fear of the police and not guilt); BALTIMORE DOJ REPORT, supra note 71 
(reflecting on how the local citizens’ fear of police results in flight). 
 78 Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 79 See id. at 124 (describing the defendant’s “unprovoked flight” as a justification for the 
officers to “investigate”). 
 80 David Collins, Neurosurgeon: Freddie Gray Suffered Complete Spinal Cord Injury, 
WBALTV (Dec. 11, 2015), http://www.wbaltv.com/article/neurosurgeon-freddie-gray-suffered-
complete-spinal-cord-injury/7097683 [https://perma.cc/624J-7ZWL]. 
 81 Timeline: Freddie Gray’s Arrest to His Fatal Spinal Cord Injury, supra note 65. 
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Freddie Gray’s request to be taken to a hospital at the third stop, instead 
choosing to lift the injured Mr. Gray off of the van’s floor and place him 
without a seatbelt restraint on the van’s steel bench.82 Officer Porter was 
charged with involuntary manslaughter, reckless endangerment, assault, and 
misconduct for failing to seek medical attention for Mr. Gray.83 After failing 
to persuade Judge Williams to shift venue out of the city, the defense elected 
to try the case in front of a jury of Baltimore citizens.84 The result after three 
days of deliberation was a hung jury, and the judge declared a mistrial.85 
The mistrial left the prosecution in a quandary. Officer Goodson, the 
van driver who was charged with the most serious crime, depraved heart 
murder, had refused to make a statement about the events of April 12.86 As a 
result, the prosecution needed the testimony of Officer Porter to establish 
some of the essential facts in their case against Goodson.87 Porter, facing 
the prospect of a second trial, indicated that he would invoke his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination if the prosecution were to call 
him to testify against his fellow officer.88 As a result, after the judge refused 
to postpone the Goodson trial to allow the State to retry Porter, it appeared 
that the prosecution would have to choose which police officer they would 
continue to pursue.89 
                                                                                                                           
 82 Id. The question of when Mr. Gray received his injury and whether Officer Porter lifted Mr. 
Gray himself or provided assistance as Mr. Gray maneuvered himself to the bench was hotly con-
tested throughout the trials. See Collins, supra note 80 (discussing the possibilities of when and 
how Mr. Gray received his injury in conjunction with the testimony of Officer Porter with respect 
to the assistance he provided). 
 83 Collins, supra note 80; How Grand Jury Charges Against Officers in Freddie Gray Case 




 84 Justin Fenton & Kevin Rector, Mistrial Declared in Trial of Officer William Porter in Death 




 85 Id.; see also State v. Rice, 136 A.3d 720, 725 (Md. 2016) (summarizing the outcome of 
Officer Porter’s trial in the Maryland Court of Special Appeals opinion on compelling Officer 
Porter’s testimony). 
 86 Justin Fenton & Kevin Rector, Officer Goodson Trial: Prosecutor Says Freddie Gray ‘Was 
Injured Because He Got a Rough Ride,’ BALT. SUN (June 9, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/
news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-goodson-day-1-20160609-story.html [https://web.archive.
org/web/20171116124915/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-
goodson-day-1-20160609-story.html]; Owens, supra note 31. 
 87 Fenton & Rector, supra note 86. 
 88 Rice, 136 A.3d at 729. 
 89 See generally Justin Fenton & Kevin Rector, Trial of Baltimore Officer Goodson Postponed 
by Maryland Appeals Court, BALT. SUN (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/
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Rather than forgo either case, the prosecution sought a court order, 
pursuant to Maryland’s immunity statute, to compel Officer Porter to testi-
fy.90 The drafted order did not grant Porter full immunity for his actions.91 
Instead, it conferred limited use immunity that barred the State from using 
evidence derived from Porter’s compelled testimony but otherwise left the 
State free to prosecute him at a later date.92 In response, Porter argued that 
limited use immunity was insufficient to protect his rights under both the 
Fifth Amendment and Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 
because “[t]here can be no real assurance that a prosecutor, either deliber-
ately or accidentally, will not use information obtained through immunized 
testimony.”93 The Circuit Court and later the Maryland Court of Appeals, 
however, held that the order was governed by the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Kastigar v. United States.94 In 1972, in Kastigar, the Supreme Court held 
that prosecutors can compel witnesses to testify with limited use immunity 
and then subsequently prosecute those witnesses so long as they demon-
strate that their evidence is “derived from a legitimate source wholly inde-
pendent of the compelled testimony.”95 
Miranda v. Arizona and years of television crime dramas have led the 
public to believe that the Fifth Amendment guarantees individuals “the right 
                                                                                                                           
maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-goodson-trial-begins-20160111-story.html [https://web.archive.
org/web/20160127215217/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-
goodson-trial-begins-20160111-story.html] (discussing the lower and appellate court decisions 
about Officer Porter’s testimony in relation to the trials of the other officers). 
 90 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-123 (West 2018); Rice, 136 A.3d at 729. The 
State’s Attorney subsequently sought to compel a second defendant, Officer Garrett Miller, to 
testify in its case against Edward Nero under a similar grant of limited immunity. Kevin Rector, 
Before Next Trial in Freddie Gray Case, Prosecutors Face Legal ‘Minefield’ Over Immunized 




 91 See Rice, 135 A.3d at 726 (upholding “use and derivative use immunity”). 
 92 Id. 
 93 MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 22; Rice, 136 A.3d at 730, 745. Article 22 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights states, “That no man ought to be compelled to give evidence 
against himself in a criminal case.” MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 22. Article 22 has 
been interpreted to be “in pari materia” with the Fifth Amendment. See Lupfer v. State, 21 A.3d 
1080, 1091 (Md. 2011) (“We have stated repeatedly that ‘the privilege against self-incrimination 
protected by Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights “generally” is “in pari materia” 
with the Self–Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Marshall v. State, 999 
A.2d 1029, 1035 (2010))). 
 94 See, e.g., Rice, 136 A.3d at 730, 746 (applying Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 
(1972) to Officer Porter’s situation). 
 95 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460. 
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to remain silent.”96 In fact, the right not to be compelled to be a witness 
against oneself is far more narrow than popular culture might lead one to 
believe. In 1892, the Supreme Court in Counselman v. Hitchcock seemed to 
suggest that nothing short of full transactional immunity would suffice to 
allow the state to compel a suspect to testify.97 In Kastigar, however, the 
Court explained that Counselman had only held that statutory grants of im-
munity had to be “coextensive” with the scope of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege, and that, rather than require full transactional immunity, the state 
could compel a witness to testify so long as it was prohibited from making 
any use of either the compelled testimony or its fruits.98 
The Kastigar Court stressed that it was the prosecution that bore the 
“heavy burden” of proving the government’s evidence was developed inde-
pendent of the compelled testimony.99 But the use and derivative use doc-
trine is hardly the “comprehensive safeguard” that the majority contended it 
to be.100 Just as Wardlow evinced the Court’s faith in the police, so too did 
Kastigar reveal the Court’s reliance on “the integrity and good faith of the 
prosecuting authorities.”101 Although Kastigar required that prosecutors 
shoulder the burden of proving their evidence is independent, as Justice 
Thurgood Marshall indicated in his dissent, stating: 
                                                                                                                           
 96 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (“Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has 
a right to remain silent . . . .”); Anderson v. Terhune, 516 F.3d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 2008) (“From 
television shows like ‘Law & Order’ to movies such as ‘Guys and Dolls,’ we are steeped in the 
culture that knows a person in custody has ‘the right to remain silent.’”); see Steven D. Stark, 
Perry Mason Meets Sonny Crockett: The History of Lawyers and the Police as Television Heroes, 
42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 229, 251 (1987) (relating the story of a suspect who told a police officer, “I 
got the right to remain silent! . . . . You guys can’t trick me. I know my rights! I watch TV!”). 
 97 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892) (suggesting that immunity statutes 
“must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question 
relates”), overruled in part by Kastigar, 406 U.S. 411 (1972); see C. Albert Bowers, Divining the 
Framers’ Intentions: The Immunity Standard for Criminal Proceedings Under the Utah Constitu-
tion, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 135, 135 (describing transactional immunity prior to Kastigar v. United 
States); see also Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 620 (1896) (affirming Counselman’s reasoning 
that full transactional immunity was necessary to satisfy the demands of the Fifth Amendment). 
 98 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453 (“Immunity from the use of compelled testimony, as well as 
evidence derived directly and indirectly therefrom, affords this protection.”). 
 99 Id. at 461–62 (“One raising a claim under this statute need only show that he testified under 
a grant of immunity in order to shift to the government the heavy burden of proving that all of the 
evidence it proposes to use was derived from legitimate independent sources.”). 
 100 See id. at 460 (“This total prohibition on use provides a comprehensive safeguard, barring 
the use of compelled testimony as an ‘investigatory lead,’ and also barring the use of any evidence 
obtained by focusing investigation on a witness as a result of his compelled disclosures.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 101 Id. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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They alone are in a position to trace the chains of information and 
investigation that lead to the evidence to be used in a criminal 
prosecution. A witness who suspects that his compelled testimony 
was used to develop a lead will be hard pressed indeed to ferret 
out the evidence necessary to prove it.102 
Given this practical reality, Justice Marshall explained, the burden of prov-
ing that evidence is independent is not difficult to meet when the defendant 
cannot produce any “contrary evidence.”103 
In fact, Kastigar did more than presume that prosecutors would act 
with the best of intentions—the Court also presumed that well-meaning 
prosecutors would not inadvertently use evidence derived from the com-
pelled testimony. In his dissent to a denial of certiorari in 1971, in Piccirillo 
v. New York, Justice William J. Brennan decried the application of use and 
derivative use immunity, not only because of the “enormous difficulty” a 
defendant would face in attempting to identify whether the evidence used 
against him was derived from his compelled testimony, but also because 
prosecutors are fallible and they might inadvertently exchange information 
or make inferences based upon compelled testimony even when they fully 
intended to respect Kastigar’s prohibitions.104 
In some respects, Officer Porter’s case might have been the best case 
scenario for the State to compel a defendant to testify with use and deriva-
tive use immunity. Porter’s first trial provided the defense and the court 
with a full preview of the State’s evidence, leaving Porter in a relatively 
good position to recognize if new evidence was offered that might have 
been derived from his compelled testimony. Viewed another way, the prose-
cution should have had little trouble meeting their “heavy burden” under 
Kastigar so long as they presented the same evidence that they had offered 
in the case that resulted in a mistrial. Yet even if the State made no adjust-
ments to their trial strategy and they presented the same case-in-chief that 
they had offered in the first trial, there remained the possibility that the case 
against Porter could be “tainted” by his compelled testimony. Justice Bren-
nan’s concern that prosecutors “working in the same office” might ex-
                                                                                                                           
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 568 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Kastigar, 
406 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven their good faith is not a sufficient safeguard. 
For the paths of information through the investigative bureaucracy may well be long and winding, 
and even a prosecutor acting in the best of faith cannot be certain that somewhere in the depths of 
his investigative apparatus, often including hundreds of employees, there was not some prohibited 
use of the compelled testimony.”). 
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change information or make “subtle inferences” based on the actions of 
their fellow attorneys presented a very real concern in the Officer Porter 
case.105 Indeed, the defense indicated that they planned to “raise questions 
about the communication between the original prosecutors and the clean 
team,” the new prosecution team that was ostensibly insulated within the 
State’s Attorney’s office from Officer Porter’s compelled testimony.106 
Ultimately, the State never had to demonstrate whether they could 
have satisfied their burden under Kastigar. On July 27, 2017, the State’s 
Attorney dropped the charges against the remaining officers without having 
secured a single conviction.107 In a case that was marked by allegations of 
prosecutorial misconduct, ethics violations, and assertions that the charges 
were both politically motivated and defamatory, it was again striking that 
the case was shaped by a constitutional doctrine that was premised on the 
“integrity and good faith of the prosecuting authorities.”108 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See Piccirillo, 400 U.S. at 568 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (expressing skepticism about the 
integrity of use and derivative use immunity). 
 106 Justin Fenton, Second Prosecutor in Freddie Gray Cases Leaves State’s Attorney’s Office, 




 107 Kevin Rector, Charges Dropped, Freddie Gray Case Concludes with Zero Convictions 
Against Officers, BALT. SUN (July 27, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-
gray/bs-md-ci-miller-pretrial-motions-20160727-story.html [https://web.archive.org/web/2018
0813214625/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-miller-pretrial-
motions-20160727-story.html]. After the State dismissed the charges against the remaining defend-
ants, the lead prosecutor, Michael Schatzow, admitted that he had communicated with the clean team 
on multiple occasions, but he denied that those communications had either violated Kastigar or that 
they had impacted the decision to drop the charges. Justin Fenton, Prosecutors in Freddie Gray Case 




 108 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 469 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (doubting whether prosecutors’ 
“good faith is . . . a sufficient safeguard”); Ryan M. McDermott, Prosecutors of Officers Accused 
in Freddie Gray Death Face Pressure for Disbarment, WASH. TIMES (July 18, 2016), https://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jul/18/john-banzhaf-law-professor-seeks-disbarment-of-
bal/ [https://perma.cc/JER6-QRV5] (highlighting concerns that prosecutors brought charges based 
on community pressure and “without sufficient evidence”); Eliott McLaughlin & Steve Almasy, 
Freddie Gray Officers Suing Prosecutor Marilyn Mosby, CNN (July 28, 2016), http://www.cnn.
com/2016/07/27/us/baltimore-marilyn-mosby-officer-lawsuits-freddie-gray/index.html [https://
perma.cc/4HCL-QMJ3] (describing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct); Kevin Rector, Law 




plaining disbarment complaints in reaction to succession of acquittals in the cases). 
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3. Failing to Disclose: Brady v. Maryland Violations in the Trials of the 
Officers Charged in the Death of Freddie Gray 
The trials of the officers charged in the death of Freddie Gray were the 
subject of national attention and intense public scrutiny.109 From the mo-
ment Marilyn Mosby publically announced the charges against the six po-
lice officers, every stage of the trial was covered by local and national me-
dia.110 Given the vast amount of attention the cases received, it was all the 
more surprising when, in the middle of the trial of the van driver, Officer 
Cesar Goodson, the prosecution was found to have failed to meet their obli-
gation under Brady v. Maryland to disclose exculpatory evidence to the de-
fense, not once, but on two separate occasions.111 
Donta Allen was an arrestee who had been transported in the same van 
as Freddie Gray.112 Because the transport wagons were split in half by a sol-
id wall, Mr. Allen was unable to observe Mr. Gray, but he initially told po-
lice investigators that Gray “was banging his head against the metal like he 
was trying to knock himself out.”113 A little over two weeks after the inci-
dent, however, Mr. Allen recanted his statement, claiming that the police 
were “trying to make it seem like I told them that, I made it like Freddie 
Gray did that to hisself [sic].”114 Mr. Allen’s contradicting claims compli-
                                                                                                                           
 109 See, e.g., Stolberg & Bidgood, supra note 41 (discussing the impact of the Freddie Gray 
trials). 
 110 See, e.g., Alter, supra note 1 (providing national coverage of the charges); Rector, supra 
note 108 (providing local coverage of the disbarment complaints leveled against the prosecutors). 
 111 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (holding that the prosecution must provide exculpatory evidence to 
the defense to comport with due process); Justin Fenton & Kevin Rector, Judge Williams to Hold 
Hearing on Witness Disclosure as Officer Goodson’s Trial Opens, BALT. SUN (June 8, 2016), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-goodson-hearing-20160608-
story.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20171116124911/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/
maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-goodson-hearing-20160608-story.html] (reporting on the possi-
bility that a potential witness interview by the prosecution provided evidence favorable to the de-
fense); Safia Samee Ali, Trial of Van Driver in Freddie Gray Case Reveals Prosecutor Violations, 
NBC NEWS (June 23, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/baltimore-unrest/trial-van-driver-
freddie-gray-case-reveals-prosecutor-violations-n596731 [https://perma.cc/J9Y5-5JJD] (explaining 
Judge Williams’s finding of two Brady violations). 
 112 Kevin Rector, Donta Allen, Man in the Van with Freddie Gray, Back in the Spotlight as 




 113 Id. 
 114 Mike Schuh, The Other Man in the Van with Freddie Gray Breaks His Silence, CBS BALT. 
(Apr. 30, 2015), http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2015/04/30/wjz-exclusive-the-other-man-in-the-van-
with-freddie-gray-breaks-his-silence/ [https://perma.cc/6ZXW-CRY5]; see Diana Owens, Coroner 
Said Death of Baltimore Detainee Freddie Gray an Accident-Witness, REUTERS, (June 16, 2016) 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-baltimore-police/coroner-said-death-of-baltimore-detainee-
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cated the narrative for both sides of the case, but it was the State’s failure to 
turn over their notes from an undisclosed second meeting with Mr. Allen 
that prompted Judge Williams to admonish the prosecution, exclaiming, 
“I’m not saying you did anything nefarious. I’m saying you don’t under-
stand what ‘exculpatory’ means.”115 
Although Judge Williams denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss on 
the basis of the State’s failure to disclose their meeting with Mr. Allen, he 
told the prosecution, “My concern becomes what else is out there. If your 
office doesn’t get [discovery obligations], I don’t know where we are at this 
point.”116 Judge Williams’s misgivings proved prescient when, not long af-
ter rebuking the State for failing to disclose their “secret” meeting with Donta 
Allen, the defense demonstrated that the State had again violated its obliga-
tions under Brady by failing to turn over the lead detective’s notes which 
included statements by the medical examiner that described Mr. Gray’s 
death as a “freakish accident.”117 
The State’s failure to turn over the notes of the lead detective, Dawnyell 
Taylor, exposed the deep distrust that existed, not only between the defense 
and the prosecution, but between the prosecution and the detectives charged 
with investigating the cases.118 In light of the State’s failure to turn over De-
tective Taylor’s notes, Judge Williams permitted the defense to call Taylor to 
the stand.119 In her testimony, she accused the prosecution of deliberately ig-
noring evidence that the officers were innocent.120 In her subsequent cross-
examination by Chief Deputy State’s Attorney Michael Schatzow, the prose-
cutor accused the detective of sabotaging the State’s case in an effort to pro-
tect her fellow officers.121 Detective Taylor’s time on the stand did little to 
restore the public’s faith in the process. Rather, it was striking that in a case 
marked by procedural doctrines that rely on the integrity of police and prose-
cutors, each agency accused the other of not being trustworthy.122 
                                                                                                                           
freddie-gray-an-accident-witness-idUSKCN0Z21Z0 [https://perma.cc/W4KE-2CML] (“Allen re-
canted that statement in court, saying he never hear[d] loud banging, adding he was high on heroin 
and Xanax when he gave his initial police report.”). 
 115 Fenton & Rector, supra note 86; Samee Ali, supra note 111. 
 116 Fenton & Rector, supra note 86 (quoting Judge Barry G. Williams). 
 117 See Samee Ali, supra note 111 (explaining the discovery of a second Brady violation). 
 118 Brian Witte, Baltimore Officer’s Trial Highlights Tensions Between Police, Prosecutors, 
NBC4 WASH. (June 16, 2016), https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Judge-Police-Officers-
Trial-to-Move-Forward-on-All-Charges-383286081.html [https://perma.cc/C8QB-W3D8]. 
 119 Samee Ali, supra note 111. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Witte, supra note 118. 
 122 It is notable that the two Brady violations identified in the trial of Officer Goodson only 
came to light because the lawyer for Donta Allen decided to come forward after watching the case 
in the press, and the chief investigating officer, Detective Dawnyell Taylor, was sympathetic to 
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Initially, Brady might appear to be the opposite of a criminal doctrine 
of faith.123 By requiring prosecutors to turn over potentially exculpatory 
evidence to the defense, the Supreme Court certainly suggested that it was 
skeptical that prosecutors would fulfill their “special duty to seek justice, 
not merely to convict” without some sort of intervention.124 Unfortunately, 
even as the Court sought to protect defendants from overzealous or unethi-
cal prosecutorial gamesmanship, the decision and its progeny were shaped 
by the Court’s abiding faith that prosecutors could be trusted to voluntarily 
and effectively execute their ethical obligations. 
Although the Brady Court recognized that the suppression of evidence 
favorable to an accused violated due process, it chose not to dictate a specif-
ic remedy to ensure that such failures didn’t recur. 125 Instead, the Court pre-
sumed that, once the constitutional obligation had been identified, prosecu-
tors would “transcend” their adversarial role and turn over exculpatory evi-
dence because their interest in winning their case would be trumped by their 
desire and obligation to do justice.126 Moreover, the Court did not require 
that prosecutors voluntarily turn over all of the evidence at their disposal, 
but only the evidence that they deemed “material either to guilt or to pun-
ishment.”127 As the Court would later explain, for evidence to be “material” 
it must not only be exculpatory, but it is must also be so persuasive that it 
would cast doubt on the criminal conviction or sentence.128 
                                                                                                                           
the officer-defendant. See Fenton & Rector, supra note 111 (detailing Donta Allen’s attorney’s 
role in the discovery of misconduct); Baynard Woods, Police Rising, REAL NEWS NETWORK 
(Nov. 30, 2017), https://therealnews.com/columns/print1130baltimorerising [https://perma.cc/
YMH5-B2ZX] (portraying Taylor’s sympathy for fellow members of her police union). If any-
thing, the failure of the prosecution to satisfy its Brady obligations in the trials of the officers in-
volved in the death of Freddie Gray raises the question: how do prosecutors behave in instances in 
which the investigators and the media are uninterested in the outcome of the case? Samee Ali, 
supra note 111 (referencing a quote from David Jaros). At one point during the trial, the Fraternal 
Order of Police tweeted a meme of Leonardo DiCaprio in “The Great Gatsby” toasting with the 
words, “Here’s to the Baltimore 6 Defense Team, The FOP and Detective Taylor.” Woods, supra. 
See generally BALTIMORE RISING (HBO Films 2017) (showing Detective Taylor pumping her fist 
when she heard news of Officer Goodson’s acquittal). 
 123 See Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Procedure Entitlements, Professionalism, and Lawyering 
Norms, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 801, 824 (2000) (“Brady exists because trust of prosecutors to reveal 
exculpatory evidence, even with clear ethical obligations, is an insufficient safeguard.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 124 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 65–66 (2011) (quotations omitted). 
 125 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 90–91 (stating the constitutional right implicated by withhold-
ing evidence but then ruling out a hypothetical remedy). 
 126 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 n.6 (1985) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87–
88). 
 127 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
 128 See Bagley, 473 U.S at 678. Although the materiality standard delineated in Bagley osten-
sibly applies to the appellate review of alleged Brady violations, various jurisdictions have used it 
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The Court’s decision to resolve the problem of prosecutors failing to 
disclose exculpatory information by simply acknowledging their duty was, 
by no means, the Court’s only option. First, the Court could have refused to 
leave it to prosecutors to determine whether exculpatory evidence was “ma-
terial.”129 Alternatively, the Court could have adopted an even broader rem-
edy and required “open file discovery,” a rule which would obligate prose-
cutors to reveal all of their evidence, both inculpatory and exculpatory, to 
the defense.130 Instead, the Court trusted that prosecutors’ sense of justice 
would be sufficient to ensure that they would turn over evidence that would 
reduce their chances of obtaining a conviction. 
Although several of the Court’s Brady decisions involved intentional 
failures to disclose, those decisions have largely downplayed the possibility 
that a significant number of prosecutors would deliberately commit mis-
conduct by hiding exculpatory evidence.131 To be fair, it is difficult to de-
vise a rule that would prevent a prosecutor from deliberately burying evi-
dence. While Brady failures continue to be unearthed with troubling fre-
quency,132 the practical challenges to uncovering what a prosecutor chooses 
not to reveal are enormous.133 
                                                                                                                           
to define the prosecutor’s discovery obligations at the trial level. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecu-
torial Disclosure Obligations, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1325 (2011) (describing the materiality 
standard as a “source of significant and ongoing controversy, because in many jurisdictions, this 
standard for reversal on appeal is also utilized as the standard for defining the duty to provide 
pretrial disclosure of information”). 
 129 See generally Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481 
(2009) (detailing the benefits of a prophylactic rule requiring disclosure of all exculpatory evi-
dence regardless of materiality, but ultimately advocating for a broader rule requiring “open file 
discovery”); Colin Starger, Expanding Stare Decisis: The Role of Precedent in the Unfolding 
Dialectic of Brady v. Maryland, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 77, 128–44 (2012) (tracing the Supreme 
Court’s sharp internal debate over interpretation of materiality culminating in Bagley). 
 130 See Burke, supra note 129, at 519 (“[T]his Article has urged a prophylactic rule requiring 
open file discovery in which prosecutors disclose not only exculpatory evidence, but all of the 
evidence against the defendant.”); Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1533, 1557 (2010) (“The best way to guarantee that defendants obtain the exculpatory 
evidence owed to them under Brady is to require ‘open file discovery’ where prosecutors must 
turn over all evidence known to the government, exculpatory and inculpatory alike.”); Starger, 
supra note 129 (highlighting dissents in the Brady line of Supreme Court cases where individual 
Justices pushed for broader interpretation of obligation to disclose). 
 131 See, e.g., Connick, 563 U.S. at 65–66 (describing presumption that prosecutors seek justice 
rather than wins); Bagley, 473 U.S. at 685 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Court’s 
holding that the prosecutor’s deliberate failure to disclose impeachment evidence was “harmless 
error”). 
 132 See Medwed, supra note 130, at 1539, 1551 (explaining that “Brady violations take place 
with regularity” and that “[a]lthough intentional Brady violations by bad actors are the exception 
rather than the rule, the annals of criminal law are sufficiently rife with anecdotes of this misbe-
havior to cause concern”); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for 
Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 698 (1987) (“[A] disturbingly large num-
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Unfortunately, the Court’s faith in prosecutors helped shape rules that 
not only make it easier for prosecutors acting in bad faith to deliberately 
suppress exculpatory evidence, but also increase the likelihood that well-
intentioned prosecutors will suppress such evidence inadvertently. By leav-
ing decisions about materiality to the discretion of prosecutors, the Court 
provided cover for “bad actors” to argue that they simply thought the evi-
dence, although exculpatory, was not material.134 In 1985, in United States 
v. Bagley, the defendant discovered that the prosecutor had failed to turn 
over exculpatory evidence that the defense had specifically requested.135 
The Supreme Court, however, ruled that even the deliberate suppression of 
potentially exculpatory evidence was irrelevant if the evidence was subse-
quently deemed to be immaterial.136 While the Court may believe that “the 
prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclo-
sure,” 137 the rule crafted in Brady and its progeny provides ample wiggle 
room for unethical attorneys to ignore their discovery obligations.138 
Perhaps the greater danger is that the Court’s faith in prosecutors shaped 
a rule which increased the odds that well-intentioned prosecutors, confident 
                                                                                                                           
ber of published opinions indicate that prosecutors knowingly presented false evidence or deliber-
ately suppressed unquestionably exculpatory evidence.”); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convic-
tions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 U. D.C. L. REV. 275, 278, 285 (2004) 
(explaining that prosecutorial misconduct, primarily failing to turn over exculpatory evidence, 
contributed to forty-five percent of the exonerated clients represented first wrought by the Inno-
cence Project and suggesting that these violations were “merely the tip of the iceberg”). 
 133 See Sara Gurwitch, When Self-Policing Does Not Work: A Proposal for Policing Prosecu-
tors in Their Obligation to Provide Exculpatory Evidence to the Defense, 50 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 303, 306–07 (2010) (“The type of full-scale re-investigation that is typically necessary to 
discover previously suppressed exculpatory evidence post-conviction is rarely conducted.”); 
Medwed, supra note 130, at 1548 (“Discretionary decisions by prosecutors, like disclosure choic-
es . . . are not made in courtrooms or during formal negotiations with defense counsel, but behind 
closed doors far from the prying eyes of defendants, judges, and state ethics boards.”). 
 134 See Medwed, supra note 130, at 1544 (considering the likelihood of non-disclosure by 
both good and bad actors); Yaroshefsky, supra note 132, at 296 (describing the reluctance of 
courts and discipline boards to second guess prosecutors’ discretionary decisions). 
 135 See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 669–70, 671–72 (detailing the evidence requested and provided, 
and then the eventual discovery of the requested evidence during the appeals process that was 
withheld). 
 136 Id. at 683 (holding that the reviewing court should consider the materiality of the evidence 
suppressed); id. at 714 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s analysis reduces the significance 
of deliberate prosecutorial suppression of potentially exculpatory evidence to that merely of one of 
numerous factors that ‘may’ be considered by a reviewing court.”). 
 137 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 
439 (1995) (“This means, naturally, that a prosecutor anxious about tacking too close to the wind 
will disclose a favorable piece of evidence.” (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108)). 
 138 See, e.g., Bagley, 473 U.S. at 706 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (explaining that the materiality 
requirement in Brady encourages prosecutors “to gamble on a finding of harmlessness” and “pro-
vides the prosecutor with ample room to withhold favorable evidence”). 
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in the strength of their case and the guilt of their defendants, might mistaken-
ly determine that exculpatory evidence need not be turned over to the de-
fense. Prosecutors are tasked with seeking justice and ensuring that defend-
ants receive fair process.139 But they also are encouraged to vigorously pur-
sue convictions and to make sure the guilty do not go free.140 The result is 
that prosecutors are particularly vulnerable to cognitive bias interfering with 
their evaluation of whether evidence is both material and exculpatory.141 By 
allowing prosecutors to withhold nonmaterial exculpatory evidence, the 
Court trusted that prosecutors would not only be motivated to satisfy the 
demands of due process, but also would be capable of making such highly 
discretionary decisions accurately in the face of powerful and often uncon-
scious incentives to find that such evidence need not be disclosed.142 
C. Faith Across the Criminal Process 
Brady, Kastigar, and Wardlow are not criminal procedure outliers. In-
deed, a quick survey of landmark Supreme Court decisions reveals a sub-
stantial number of doctrines predicated on faith in the system and its actors. 
Moreover, these doctrines of faith are not limited to one particular area, but 
rather span the entire criminal process. From investigation and pretrial dis-
covery to the trial itself, one can find examples of doctrines that have been 
                                                                                                                           
 139 See Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Con-
victions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 405 (“In this role as a 
minister of justice, the prosecutor has the responsibility ‘not simply . . . of an advocate,’ but to 
adopt a somewhat neutral stance ‘to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that 
guilt is decided upon the basis of the sufficient evidence.’” (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003)) (citing United States v. Kalfayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 
1323 (9th Cir. 1993))). 
 140 Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 
2471 (2004) (“[P]rosecutors want to ensure convictions . . . . Favorable win-loss statistics boost 
prosecutors’ egos, their esteem, their praise by colleagues, and their prospects for promotion and 
career advancement.”); see also Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecu-
tor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 390 (2001) (“The desire to win inevitably wins out over mat-
ters of procedural fairness, such as disclosure.”). 
 141 See Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cogni-
tive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1590–91 (2006) (describing how cognitive bias can 
affect the exercise of prosecutorial discretionary decisions); Susan S. Kuo & C.W. Taylor, In 
Prosecutors We Trust: UK Lessons for Illinois Disclosure, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 695, 706–07 
(2007) (“The desire to win a case may cause some prosecutors to concentrate their sights solely on 
achieving victory, at the expense of upholding justice. The quest for success can affect a prosecu-
tor’s ability to objectively weigh the materiality of potentially exculpatory evidence, a phenome-
non referred to as ‘tunnel vision’ or ‘confirmatory bias.’” (footnote omitted)). 
 142 See Medwed, supra note 130, at 1551 (“The most pressing problem relates to how well-
meaning prosecutors tend to interpret their constitutional disclosure obligations in a way that all 
too often leads to withholding.”). 
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shaped by the Court’s belief that prosecutors and the police “dutifully carry 
out their obligations within constitutional limits.”143 
At the early stages of the criminal process, the Court has allowed of-
ficers to deliberately create exigent circumstances “with the bad faith in-
tent” of avoiding the warrant requirement, excused the unlawful detention 
of suspects if the officer subsequently discovers a warrant, and endorsed 
pretextual traffic stops despite concerns that the practice could invite racial 
profiling.144 During pretrial discovery, prosecutors are trusted to evaluate 
their evidence and decide for themselves what they should be obligated to 
turn over to the defense.145 At trial, prosecutors can deny defendants the 
opportunity to waive a jury.146 Then, when picking that jury, prosecutors can 
offer an “implausible or fantastic” justification for striking a juror and their 
reason need not make sense so long as it is held to be race neutral.147 At 
each stage of the criminal process, one finds doctrines built on the presump-
tion that police and prosecutors understand their legal obligations and can 
be trusted to act with integrity and honesty.148 
Yet, although it is relatively easy to identify Criminal Doctrines of 
Faith throughout the criminal process, it is more difficult to discern the ba-
sis for the Court’s trust. While some decisions betray an idealistic view of 
how police and prosecutors behave, others appear to be shaped by the 
Court’s belief that institutional checks will prevent criminal justice actors 
from abusing their authority. To further complicate the inquiry, some deci-
sions may be shaped by a faith in the system and its actors that is derived 
from more than one source. 
                                                                                                                           
 143 E.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380, 389 (5th Cir. 1999) (framing the Fourth 
Amendment as a check on the power of the police), vacated en banc, 171 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 
1999). 
 144 See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016) (holding that discovering a warrant vali-
dated evidence seized after an unlawful detention); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 464 (2011) 
(invalidating a subjective test of “bad faith intent”); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810-11 
(1996) (rejecting the concerns of petitioners—black men—that police pull over certain individuals 
committing common traffic violations on pretext and not to actually enforce the traffic laws); see 
also Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 431 (1997) (“Em-
pirical evidence suggests that race is frequently the defining factor in pretextual traffic stops.”). 
 145 See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 671 (detailing what the prosecution did not turn over in response 
to defendant’s pretrial discovery request). 
 146 Singer, 380 U.S. at 36–37. 
 147 See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768–69 (1995) (holding that the prosecutor’s strike of a 
black juror could be justified and found race neutral when the juror was struck on the basis that he 
had “long, unkempt hair, a mustache, and a beard”). 
 148 See, e.g., Singer, 380 U.S. at 37 (referencing the Court’s “confidence in the integrity of the 
federal prosecutor” to support its decision to allow prosecutors to compel a defendant to have a 
jury trial). 
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The following section examines some of the Court’s most prominent 
criminal procedure decisions and identifies three potential sources of faith for 
the doctrines established by those cases. After disaggregating the Court’s po-
tential justifications for trusting police and prosecutors, the subsequent sec-
tion explores what it might mean if the Court’s faith proves to be misplaced. 
II. THREE SOURCES OF FAITH IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DOCTRINE 
A. Faith in Character 
Scholars have explored multiple rationales for the Court’s deference to 
police and prosecutors.149 In some instances, separation of powers concerns 
deter courts from interfering in the daily work of law enforcement.150 Other 
times, the Court’s reluctance to act stems from its presumption that the po-
lice have a special expertise that warrants deference to their “street level” 
decisions.151 There exists, however, an additional rationale that has largely 
gone unacknowledged— that the Court’s doctrine may be built, in part, on 
its faith in the strength of character of these criminal justice actors. 
                                                                                                                           
 149 See, e.g., Lvovsky, supra note 10, at 1997–98 (summarizing existing criticism of the 
Court’s reliance on police expertise); Stoughton, supra note 10, at 848–49 (identifying and chal-
lenging the Supreme Court’s factual presumptions about the nature of policing). 
 150 See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
989, 1025 (2006) (“The Supreme Court is of the view that a prosecutor’s charging and plea bar-
gaining decisions are largely off limits from judicial review.”); David M. Jaros & Adam S. Zim-
merman, Judging Aggregate Settlement, 94 WASH. U.L. REV. 545, 590 (2017) (“[C]onstitutional 
concerns regarding the separation of powers also impede the judiciary from seizing control of the 
settlement process.”). 
 151 See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (“[A] police officer views the 
facts through the lens of his police experience and expertise.”); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 
411, 418 (1981) (“[A] trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions—inferences and 
deductions that might well elude an untrained person.”); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 
(1979) (“This situation is to be distinguished from the observations of a trained, experienced po-
lice officer who is able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be whol-
ly innocent to the untrained observer.”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968) (“Officer McFadden 
had no probable cause to arrest Terry for anything, but he had observed circumstances that would 
reasonably lead an experienced, prudent policeman to suspect that Terry was about to engage in 
burglary or robbery.” (emphasis added)); see also Lvovsky, supra note 10, at 1997–98 (describing 
the Court’s view of the police as experts); Eric J. Miller, Detective Fiction: Race, Authority, and 
the Fourth Amendment, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 213, 227 (2012) (“Police training and experience thus 
establishes the police as craftsmen members of a specialized guild, one that the Court has granted 
something of a monopoly on evaluating the significance of criminogenic evidence. The rest of us, 
including the judiciary, lack this specialized guild knowledge and so should defer to the on-the-
street judgments of police experts.”); L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth 
Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2063 (2011) (“The Court’s behavioral assumption is that 
officers, based upon their experiences, are better than civilians at distinguishing innocent from 
guilty conduct. Presumably, as frequent observers of behavior, officers are better equipped to 
predict whether an individual’s behavior signals involvement in criminal activity.”). 
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The idea that police and prosecutors follow a “moral code” is deeply 
embedded in popular culture.152 In many respects, the recurring explanation 
that prosecutors and police officers who violate the rules are “bad apples” 
implies that the vast majority of law enforcement actors can be trusted to 
obey both the letter and spirit of the law.153 This faith in law enforcement 
plays out in three interrelated assumptions: (1) police and prosecutors do 
not regularly engage in misconduct in the course of their duties; (2) they 
will voluntarily follow the constitutional rules promulgated by the Court; 
and, (3) they are not only willing to follow, but are also capable of follow-
ing, those constitutional rules. 
Although it is never explicitly acknowledged, the Court’s assumption 
that the police do not regularly engage in misconduct is essential to deci-
sions like Illinois v. Wardlow. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s determination that 
flight from the police is “suggestive” of criminality is premised on a world 
in which police officers do not regularly harass individuals when they en-
                                                                                                                           
 152 See Anthony V. Alfieri, Community Prosecutors, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1465, 1504 (2002) 
(describing “[g]ood prosecutors . . . [as] the virtuous agents of justice and the celebrants of truth”); 
see also Brian M. Murray, Prosecutorial Responsibility and Collateral Consequences, 12 STAN. J. 
CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 213, 240 (2016) (“Constitutional criminal process jurisprudence al-
ready views the prosecutor as a special agent of justice.”); Ronald M. Sandgrund, Dialogue: Does 
Popular Culture Influence Lawyers, Judges, and Juries?—Part III, 44 COLO. LAWYER 51, 54 
(Mar. 2015) (“Generally speaking, TV pits ‘good guy’ prosecutors against ‘bad guy’ defense at-
torneys, and places prosecutors, as opposed to defense attorneys, on the moral high ground of the 
legal practice.”). 
 153 See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 618 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (“My sincere respect for the competence of the typical member of the law en-
forcement profession precludes my assent to the suggestion that a reasonable officer could have 
believed that bringing members of the media into a home during the execution of an arrest warrant 
was lawful.”); Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 51, 52 (2016) (describing the assumption that “intentional prosecutorial law-
breaking was aberrational, the fault of rogue prosecutors—‘a few bad apples’” (citation omitted)); 
Aliza Chasin, Jersey City Suspends Officers Who Kicked Victim on Fire After Crash, Two Deputy 
Chiefs Transferred, WPIX 11 NEWS (June 12, 2017), http://pix11.com/2017/06/12/jersey-city-
suspends-officers-who-kicked-victim-on-fire-after-crash-transfers-others/ [https://web.archive.org/
web/20170911085039/https://pix11.com/2017/06/12/jersey-city-suspends-officers-who-kicked-
victim-on-fire-after-crash-transfers-others/] (“Look, we have a high standard for the police de-
partment . . . . They do a tremendous job. We’re not going to let just a few bad apples be a reflec-
tion on the entire police department or the entire city[,]” quoting Jersey City Mayor Steven 
Fulop’s response to four officers beating an innocent bystander); Ferguson Mayor Says ‘Bad Ap-
ples’ Not Indicative of Police Dept., NBS NIGHTLY NEWS WITH LESTER HOLT (Mar. 13, 2015), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/nightly-news/video/ferguson-mayor-says-bad-apples-not-indicative-of-
police-dept-412990019892 [https://perma.cc/V2SM-JYPS] (characterizing disparate racial impact 
of police actions or racial bias within the police department as due to a few “bad apples”); see also 
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Police Accountability (HBO television broadcast Oct. 2, 
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zaD84DTGULo [https://perma.cc/6457-EDTG] (high-
lighting community calls for accountability that are met with the “just a few bad apples” argu-
ment). 
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gage in non-criminal activities.154 If a sufficient number of police officers 
intimidate, abuse, take property, or otherwise mistreat law-abiding citizens, 
then the foundation of the Wardlow doctrine collapses.155 Notably, the as-
sumption that police officers do not commit such misconduct is separate 
from the assumption that the police willingly follow the constitutional limits 
the Court places upon their activities. Viewed narrowly, Wardlow only in-
volved a determination about what constituted reasonable suspicion.156 The 
critical assumption in Wardlow—that the police do not mistreat the public— 
is separate from the particular rule that the Court established, yet it was an 
essential prerequisite to the decision. Nor was it the only assumption about 
the moral character of law enforcement embedded in Wardlow. In addition 
to assuming that law abiding citizens would not have good reasons to run 
from the police, the Court made a second assumption about moral charac-
ter—that, once established, the police can be trusted not to subvert the con-
stitutional restrictions that the Court places on them. 
Seth Stoughton, a legal scholar and a former police officer, noted in his 
article, Policing Facts, that “[t]he Court has only rarely credited fears that 
police officers will attempt to circumscribe the constitutional limits to their 
authority.”157 In Wardlow, the Court assumed that officers would diligently 
adhere to the rules it had been refining since 1968 when Terry v. Ohio re-
quired that officers restrain themselves from seizing a suspect if they lacked 
reasonable suspicion.158 What went unacknowledged in the decision was the 
possibility that the Court’s explanations might be used by officers to tailor 
their testimony to ensure the admissibility of evidence they recovered under 
questionable circumstances. 
                                                                                                                           
 154 See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (holding that flight may be a factor 
when police calculate reasonable suspicion); see supra notes 49–79 and accompanying text. 
 155 See, e.g., Dan Rodricks, The High Cost of Bad Cops, BALT. SUN, (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.
baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/dan-rodricks-blog/bs-md-rodricks-0107-story.html [https://web.
archive.org/web/20180910040139/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/dan-rodricks-
blog/bs-md-rodricks-0107-story.html] (describing revelations that officers in the Baltimore Gun 
Trace Task Force were robbing and assaulting members of the public, selling drugs, planting evi-
dence, and writing false reports, and how that impacted the public’s trust). 
 156 See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (drawing the boundaries around what factors can influence 
a finding of reasonable suspicion). 
 157 Stoughton, supra note 10, at 861; see also Anthony O’Rourke, Structural Overdelegation 
in Criminal Procedure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 407, 411 (2013) (“[T]he court may un-
derestimate the extent to which law enforcement officials are unable or unwilling to implement a 
constitutional objective, and might therefore use the discretion they are accorded to undermine the 
objective.”) 
 158 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (establishing that the police must have reasonable suspicion to seize 
a suspect). 
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One might well argue that, in the case of Wardlow, the Court had few 
options other than trusting the police to follow its instructions, but the same 
cannot be said of its decision in 2016 in Utah v. Strieff. In Strieff, the Court 
refused to suppress the fruit of an unlawful search because the officer sub-
sequently discovered that the defendant, whom he had unlawfully stopped, 
had an outstanding warrant for a traffic violation.159 While the majority was 
quick to chalk up the officer’s Fourth Amendment violation to “two good-
faith mistakes,”160 the dissenters took a more skeptical view. Justice Elena 
Kagan described the stop as a “calculated decision . . . designed for investi-
gatory purposes.”161 In a striking acknowledgement of the possibility that 
the police might deliberately circumvent the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
protections, another dissenter, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, stressed that such 
strategic violations of the Fourth Amendment were not “isolated instance[s] 
of negligence,” but rather were “the product of institutionalized training 
procedures.”162 Justice Sotomayor’s acknowledgement that many officers 
are taught to “stop and question first, develop reasonable suspicion later” 
was particularly notable in light of the majority’s refusal to acknowledge 
the possibility that the police might deliberately sidestep the Fourth 
Amendment protections established by the Court’s own decisions.163 
Strieff is not the only case where the majority of the Court conspicu-
ously failed to acknowledge the possibility that the police might purposely 
circumvent or openly violate constitutional rules. In 1980, in United States 
v. Mendenhall, the majority was torn between concluding that Federal 
Agents had reasonable suspicion to seize Ms. Mendenhall between airline 
flights and escort her to a DEA office for a strip-search and concluding that 
no seizure ever took place because Ms. Mendenhall voluntarily accompa-
nied the officers to be searched.164 Although the conclusion of Chief Justice 
Warren E. Burger and Justices Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and Harry Blackmun 
that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Ms. Mendenhall is debata-
ble, it was the determination by the remainder of the majority that the de-
fendant voluntarily chose to forego her connecting flight and instead elected 
                                                                                                                           
 159 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016). 
 160 Id. at 2063 (“In stopping Strieff, Officer Fackrell made two good-faith mistakes.”). 
 161 Id. at 2072 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 162 Id. at 2063; id. at 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
 163 Id. at 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The New York City Police Department long 
trained officers to, in the words of a District Judge, ‘stop and question first, develop reasonable 
suspicion later.’” (quoting Ligon v. New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2013))). 
 164 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555, 560 (1980) (finding that Ms. Mendenhall 
was not seized for Fourth Amendment purposes, and that the actions of law enforcement complied 
with Fourth Amendment standards). 
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to take part in a strip search that demonstrated the Court’s deep and abiding 
faith in the character of the police. 
Finding that “nothing in the record suggests that . . . [Ms. Mendenhall] 
had any objective reason to believe that she was not free to end the conver-
sation in the concourse and proceed on her way,” Justice Stewart and then-
Justice Rehnquist assumed that a “reasonable person” could trust that the 
officers would respect her decision to invoke her Fourth Amendment 
rights.165 In fact, as the dissent noted, the agents conceded that Ms. 
Mendenhall would have been forcibly restrained if she had refused their 
“request.”166 If one acknowledges a world in which police officers ignore 
the invocation of constitutional rights, the finding that Ms. Mendenhall 
“freely and voluntarily” consented to her detention and search becomes du-
bious at best. The majority’s faith in police officers’ moral character and its 
presumption that officers dutifully follow the constitutional rules estab-
lished by the Court is thus an unspoken but critical component of the 
Court’s decisions allowing for the voluntary waiver of constitutional rights. 
If one were to acknowledge that suspects reasonably expect that their invo-
cation of constitutional rights will be ignored, then waivers of those rights 
can hardly be deemed “voluntary.”167 
In addition to assuming that the police conscientiously follow the 
Court’s constitutional mandates, the Court also maintains its faith in the 
capacity of law enforcement to follow the complex doctrines the Court has 
established. In her article, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 
Anna Lvovsky describes how both lower and appellate courts have em-
braced the idea that police have specialized expertise and knowledge that 
deserve the courts’ deference and respect.168 As Lvovsky explains, the idea 
that the police possess unique experiences and training that give them supe-
rior abilities to detect and appropriately respond to criminal activity (and 
danger) has shaped the Fourth Amendment doctrines that ostensibly regu-
                                                                                                                           
 165 See id. at 554–55 (defining Fourth Amendment seizure from the view of a “reasonable 
person” with the “reasonable person” as the one seized). 
 166 Id. at 576 (White, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, the only testimony concerning what occurred 
between Agent Anderson’s ‘request’ and Ms. Mendenhall’s arrival at the DEA office is the 
agent’s testimony that if Ms. Mendenhall had wanted to leave at that point she would have been 
forcibly restrained.”). 
 167 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 472–73 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (“When a suspect understands his (expressed) wishes to have been ignored . . . in 
contravention of the ‘rights’ just read to him by his interrogator, he may well see further objection 
as futile and confession (true or not) as the only way to end his interrogation.”). 
 168 See Lvovsky, supra note 10 at 1998–99 (outlining the growing respect afforded to the 
police by the judiciary). 
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late police behavior.169 The Court’s faith in the police’s exceptional compe-
tence, however, is not limited to their crime fighting skills. Embedded im-
plicitly in its decisions is the Court’s presumption that the police can learn 
and apply the complex legal doctrines that it outlines in its cases.170 Thus, 
the Court assumes that officers on the beat can appreciate not only the dis-
tinctions between “reasonable suspicion” and “probable cause” but also 
how those distinctions affect their authority to stop, detain, and arrest. 
The Court’s faith in prosecutors, reflected in cases like Brady v. Mary-
land in 1963 and Kastigar v. United States in 1972 closely mirrors the as-
sumptions it made about police officers in cases like Wardlow: (1) they do 
not commit misconduct; (2) they diligently follow Court imposed constitu-
tional limits; and (3) they are capable of applying complicated legal rules to 
their everyday practice. 
Although Brady and its progeny outlined prosecutors’ constitutional 
obligation to turn over exculpatory evidence that is “material,” those deci-
sions presumed that, once informed of their discovery obligations, prosecu-
tors would diligently seek to satisfy them.171 Although evidence suggests 
that Brady violations are “more than episodic” and that “scores of innocent 
people have been convicted by those violations,” there is no way to know 
how many such failures are due to prosecutors consciously disregarding 
their ethical responsibilities.172 What is clear is that because the Court had 
sufficient faith that prosecutors would transcend their adversarial role if told 
to do so, it created no mechanism to ensure compliance with the Court’s 
requirements and left it to the prosecutors themselves to decide whether 
evidence was both material and exculpatory.173 
                                                                                                                           
 169 Id. at 2025 (“Tracking closely with the rise of the police expert witness, judges also began 
invoking the police’s criminological insights as grounds for deference under the Fourth Amend-
ment.”). 
 170 Occasionally, the Court makes the presumption explicitly. See, e.g., Davis, 564 U.S. at 241 
(“Responsible law enforcement officers will take care to learn ‘what is required of them’ under 
Fourth Amendment precedent and will conform their conduct to these rules.” (citation omitted)). 
 171 See supra notes 111–142 and accompanying text. 
 172 Barry Scheck, Four Reforms for the Twenty-First Century, 96 JUDICATURE 323, 330 
(2013); see Kuo & Taylor, supra note 141, at 705 (suggesting that some Brady failures “arise from 
the prosecution’s deliberate decision to withhold information from the defense” and citing several 
notable examples). 
 173 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 n.6 (1985) (“The Court has recognized, 
however, that the prosecutor’s role transcends that of an adversary: he ‘is the representative not of 
an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty . . . whose interest . . . in a criminal prose-
cution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.’” (quoting Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963))); Bennett 
L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
531, 533 (2007) (“Brady depends on the integrity, good faith, and professionalism of the prosecu-
tor for its effectiveness.”). 
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The Court’s belief that prosecutors would diligently follow Court im-
posed constitutional limits and subvert their desire to win in favor of their 
loyalty to truth and the law was similarly evidenced in Kastigar. As dis-
cussed above, Kastigar requires that prosecutors prove to the court that the 
evidence they seek to use is not the product of the defendant’s coerced tes-
timony.174 In practice, this requirement offers defendants little solace. As 
the dissent in Kastigar noted, because defendants are in a poor position to 
demonstrate that the prosecutor’s evidence was not acquired independently, 
the government will likely have little difficulty satisfying its burden.175 Jus-
tice Marshall explained, “The good faith of the prosecuting authorities is 
thus the sole safeguard of the witness’ rights.”176 
Brady and Kastigar also reflect the Court’s belief that prosecutors are 
not only willing to follow the Court’s constitutional directives, but they are 
also capable of doing so. There is a very real danger that prosecutors, anx-
ious to ensure that guilty defendants do not go free and incentivized profes-
sionally to obtain “wins,” will persuade “themselves that a satisfactory rea-
son justifies not providing the exculpatory evidence, such as ‘the defense 
must have discovered it themselves,’ or ‘it is just an aberration and does not 
really undercut the prosecution’s case.’”177 Similarly, as the dissent noted in 
Kastigar, prosecutors may not be aware that fellow prosecutors or investiga-
tors who have worked on the case have either deliberately or, perhaps, inad-
vertently made use of the compelled testimony.178 
B. Faith in Institutions 
While the Court’s decisions appear to place great faith in the moral 
character of police and prosecutors, there may be an alternative explanation 
for its willingness to trust law enforcement to do the right thing—the 
Court’s faith in the institutions in which those actors work. In Hudson v. 
Michigan, the Supreme Court rejected a categorical rule excluding evidence 
obtained in violation of its “knock and announce” rule stating, “[a]s long 
ago as 1980 we felt it proper to ‘assume’ that unlawful police behavior 
                                                                                                                           
 174 See supra notes 94–108 and accompanying text. 
 175 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 469 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 176 Id. 
 177 Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for Reform, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 1, 34 (2001); see also Bibas, supra note 140, at 2471 (discussing the professional pressures 
on prosecutors); Burke, supra note 141, at 1590–91 (describing how cognitive bias can affect 
prosecutorial discretion). 
 178 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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would ‘be dealt with appropriately’ by the authorities.”179 Similarly, despite 
a “flagrantly illegal search,” the Court, in United States v. Payner, reinstated 
the defendant’s conviction explaining that lower courts should not “assume 
that similar lawless conduct, if brought to the attention of responsible offi-
cials, would not be dealt with appropriately.”180 Thus, it may be that the 
Court’s faith is not in the individual moral strength of police and prosecu-
tors, but rather in the institutional capacity of administrative agencies to 
effectively regulate the behavior of their members. 
Just as the Hudson Court relied on “internal police discipline” to en-
sure that officers would “take the constitutional rights of citizens seriously,” 
the Court has dismissed concerns about prosecutorial misconduct by assum-
ing that prosecutor offices would adopt policies and disciplinary procedures 
to regulate themselves.181 In 2017, in Turner v. United States, the Court was 
reassured that prosecutors who had failed to turn over exculpatory evidence 
to the defense had adopted a new “generous policy of discovery” to ensure 
that they would meet their future Brady obligations.182 Similarly, in 1983, in 
United States v. Hasting, the Court admonished the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals for reversing a conviction when the prosecutor had commented at 
trial on the defendants’ failure to testify, suggesting, instead, that the court 
should have relied on the Department of Justice’s internal disciplinary pro-
cedures to deal with the problem.183 
                                                                                                                           
 179 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598–99 (2006) (quoting United States v. Payner, 447 
U.S. 727, 733 n.5 (1980)) (internal quotations and lack of irony omitted). 
 180 Payner, 447 U.S. at 733 n.5; see also Eric J. Miller, Detective Fiction: Race, Authority, 
and the Fourth Amendment, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 213, 219–20 (2012) (explaining that the Court pre-
sumes that “superior officers transmit respect for the Constitution and fourth-amendment norms to 
their inferior officers, and punish failures to abide by the requirements (including the constitution-
al requirements) of police professionalism” (footnote omitted)). 
 181 See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 598–99 (implying faith in a more professionalized police force). 
Although the Court has generally assumed that existing administrative controls are sufficient to 
effectively regulate prosecutors, some scholars have proposed reforms to increase internal over-
sight and diminish the risk that prosecutors will commit misconduct or abuse their considerable 
discretion. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: 
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009) (proposing a model that spreads 
certain functions of a prosecutor office among different types of prosecutors); Stephanos Bibas, 
Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959 (2009) (pro-
moting the use of internal business-like incentives to change the culture of prosecutors’ offices). 
 182 Turner v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1885, 1893 (2017) (“[T]he Government assured the 
Court at oral argument that subsequent to petitioners’ trial, it ha[d] adopted a generous policy of 
discovery in criminal cases under which it discloses any information that a defendant might wish 
to use.”). 
 183 United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 n.5 (1983) (suggesting the circuit court “could 
have dealt with the offending argument . . . by asking the Department of Justice to initiate a disci-
plinary proceeding against [the prosecutor]” (citation omitted)). 
2018] Criminal Doctrines of Faith 2239 
In addition to relying on prosecutor offices to discipline attorneys who 
commit misconduct, the Court has cited the ethical demands of the bar as 
further reason to trust prosecutors to follow the law.184 In 1976, in Imbler v. 
Pachtman, the Court explained that the public need not fear prosecutorial 
misconduct because “a prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials 
whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability 
to professional discipline by an association of his peers.”185 In 2011, in 
Connick v. Thompson, the Court went so far as to find that a District Attor-
ney was excused from providing the attorneys who worked for him “formal 
in-house training about how to obey the law” because he was “entitled to 
rely on prosecutors’ professional training and ethical obligations . . . to pre-
vent . . . constitutional violations.”186 Unfortunately, the wisdom of the 
Court’s reliance on the bar to ensure that prosecutors heed their ethical (and 
constitutionally mandated) duties may be more dubious than the case law 
suggests. In fact, multiple studies suggest that prosecutors are rarely disci-
plined by the bar even after appellate courts identified “prosecutorial mis-
conduct [that] led to dismissals, sentence reductions, or reversals . . . .”187 
To some extent, the exclusionary rule, one of the most prominent rem-
edies crafted by the Court to regulate police and prosecutors, is premised on 
the idea that law enforcement institutions will penalize members who ham-
per successful prosecutions by failing to follow the Court’s constitutional 
                                                                                                                           
 184 See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 66 (2011) (finding that the District Attorney was 
entitled to presume that his prosecutors would understand and fulfill their Brady obligations, be-
cause “[a]n attorney who violates his or her ethical obligations is subject to professional disci-
pline, including sanctions, suspension, and disbarment”); Lesley E. Williams, The Civil Regula-
tion of Prosecutors, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3441, 3441 (1999) (“The availability of discipline by 
professional associations in cases of prosecutorial misconduct encouraged the Supreme Court to 
grant prosecutors absolute immunity for trial-related activities under § 1983.”). 
 185 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976). 
 186 Connick, 563 U.S. at 66–67. 
 187 Shima Baradaran Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1071, 
1097 (2017) (noting that “over 2000 cases from 1970 to 2003 where prosecutorial misconduct led 
to dismissals, sentence reductions, or reversals, prosecutors were disciplined in only forty-four of 
those cases”); see also Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of 
Interest, 58 B.C. L. REV. 463, 485 (2017) (“Prosecutors are rarely disciplined for anything . . . .”); 
David Keenan, Deborah Jane Cooper, David Lebowitz & Tamar Lerer, The Myth of Prosecutorial 
Accountability After Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures 
Cannot Protect Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 203, 220 (2011), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-myth-of-prosecutorial-accountability-after-connick-v-
thompson-why-existing-professional-responsibility-measures-cannot-protect-against-
prosecutorial-misconduct [https://perma.cc/9KLW-HJC4] (describing multiple studies in which 
the bar failed to discipline prosecutors after their misconduct had been identified by the courts). 
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rules.188 The effectiveness of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent depends on 
a number of assumptions.189 Chief among them is the notion that law en-
forcement actors are personally invested in the success of the criminal 
case—either out of a desire for justice or because of their own personal in-
terests.190 Yet, there are reasons to question to what extent police depart-
ments and prosecutor offices actually incentivize their employees to follow 
their own internal policies and the law.191 
As former law enforcement officer and legal scholar Seth Stoughton 
has described, “officers are under no formal pressure to concern themselves 
with convictions, and there is informal discouragement of such concern.”192 
Although often anecdotal, there is considerable support for the proposition 
that officers are encouraged to focus not on the admissibility of evidence 
but on making arrests.193 As one officer explained, “[My supervisor] really 
likes arrests, and I give them to him . . . . I don’t give a shit if they [the 
state’s attorney’s office] won’t take it. That’s their problem.”194 Similarly, 
while prosecutors ostensibly are governed by not only internal policies but 
also the ethical rules that govern all attorneys, “few observers of [the] sys-
tem have confidence that [internal regulation] serves as an adequate mecha-
nism for ensuring prosecutorial accountability.”195 
                                                                                                                           
 188 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (“The rule is calculated to prevent, 
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 189 See, e.g., Eugene R. Milhizer, Debunking Five Great Myths About the Fourth Amendment 
Exclusionary Rule, 211 MIL. L. REV. 211, 229–30 (2012) (offering seven distinct reasons why the 
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 190 See, e.g., George M. Dery III, Allowing “Lawless Police Conduct” in Order to Forbid 
“Lawless Civilian Conduct”: The Court Further Erodes the Exclusionary Rule in Utah v. Strieff, 
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 191 See, e.g., Fred Klein, A View from Inside the Ropes: A Prosecutor’s Viewpoint on Disclos-
ing Exculpatory Evidence, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 867, 876 (2010) (“I would not be the first to sug-
gest that the failure to disclose exculpatory information results from an office culture that rewards 
convictions and breeds an attitude that the prosecution is engaged in a battle against the guilty, so 
the ends justify the means.”). 
 192 Stoughton, supra note 10, at 877. 
 193 Id. at 877–82 (describing officer indifference to conviction rates and the failure of police 
agencies to discipline officers whose errors prevent convictions). 
 194 PETER MOSKOS, COP IN THE HOOD: MY YEAR POLICING BALTIMORE’S EASTERN DIS-
TRICT 44 (2008). 
 195 Yaroshefsky, supra note 132, at 289; see Bibas, supra note 181, at 976 (“One empirical 
survey found that state bar authorities had reviewed only fourteen cases in six years in which 
prosecutors had suppressed exculpatory or impeachment evidence.”); Bennett L. Gershman, Re-
flections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 722–23 (2006) (“The absence of signifi-
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There remains, however, a third possible explanation for the faith in 
police and prosecutors that has shaped the Court’s criminal procedure juris-
prudence. It may be that the Court relies, not on the moral character of po-
lice and prosecutors nor on the restraints imposed by the institutions in 
which they work, but rather on the judiciary’s ability to effectively deter 
misconduct and ensure that constitutional rules are followed. 
C. Faith in the Courts 
The Court may not believe that police and prosecutors are especially 
trustworthy or that the institutions within which they work are particularly 
effective at restraining their behavior. Instead, the Court may have faith in the 
judicial system to deter misconduct and identify those instances in which po-
lice or prosecutors break constitutional rules. Arguably, the three doctrinal 
criminal procedure cases that played pivotal roles in the Freddie Gray trials—
Brady, Kastigar, and Wardlow—assumed, not that all police and prosecu-
tors would diligently follow the constitutional rules dictated by the Court, 
but rather that the courts could effectively root out and remedy those in-
stances in which those rules were violated. 
In Kastigar, the Court did not merely identify the State’s obligation to 
refrain from using the defendant’s compelled statement and evidence de-
rived from the compelled statement.196 It also placed on the prosecution the 
“heavy burden” of proving to the trial court that “all of the evidence it pro-
pose[d] to use was derived from legitimate independent sources.”197 At first 
blush, Kastigar might appear skeptical of prosecutors—adopting a “trust 
but verify” approach rather than just assuming that prosecutors would vol-
untarily refrain from using “fruit” of the compelled testimony against the 
defendant. This view, however, is predicated on the assumption that trial 
courts can ferret out those instances when the compelled testimony has bled 
into the defendant’s trial. 
Although evidence developed prior to the compelled testimony is ob-
viously independent, trial courts face a difficult task in identifying whether 
                                                                                                                           
cant discipline of prosecutors is particularly noteworthy in cases in which prosecutors intentional-
ly suppress evidence that leads to a reversal of a defendant’s conviction and a stinging rebuke by a 
court of the prosecutor’s misconduct. Although one would realistically expect disciplinary agen-
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 196 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460. 
 197 Id. at 461–62. 
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subsequently discovered evidence is tainted. Despite the Kastigar majori-
ty’s claim that prosecutors bear a “heavy burden” to prove proffered evi-
dence was developed independently, it is relatively easy for a prosecutor to 
manufacture innocent accounts for how evidence was discovered and quite 
challenging for trial courts to see through such explanations.198 An “informal 
and undetected exchange of information” is almost impossible for a defend-
ant to uncover.199 Additionally, as Justice Marshall noted in his dissent:  
[T]he paths of information through the investigative bu-
reaucracy may well be long and winding, and even a prose-
cutor acting in the best of faith cannot be certain that 
somewhere in the depths of his investigative apparatus, of-
ten including hundreds of employees, there was not some 
prohibited use of the compelled testimony.200 
Although the Court may have faith in trial courts’ ability to discern fact 
from fiction, evidence suggests that judges are either “unable to distinguish 
carefully crafted lies from truth or . . . they err on the side of punishing a 
culpable defendant, even if the police may have lied.”201 Thus, the Kastigar 
majority might have believed that trial courts provide “very substantial pro-
tection.”202 But, in contrast to the Court’s belief, the reality for defendants is 
that they are confronted with a doctrine that “leave[s] the witness ‘depend-
ent for the preservation of his rights upon the integrity and good faith of the 
prosecuting authorities.’”203 
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dissenting) (“A witness who suspects that his compelled testimony was used to develop a lead will 
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Much like Kastigar, the Wardlow decision was also built on the idea 
that trial courts act as a backstop to ensure that evidence that is acquired 
unconstitutionally is filtered out before trial. In addition to demonstrating 
the Court’s belief that honest citizens need not fear the police, Wardlow op-
erated on the presumption that courts could review the circumstances of the 
arrest, which are typically related to the court by the arresting officer, and 
make an accurate determination as to whether or not the police had the legal 
authority to detain the suspect.204 Yet, a number of studies raise doubts as to 
whether such hearings effectively deter police misconduct.205 First, there is 
scant evidence that the requirement that officers testify under oath inhibits 
the police from inventing facts which support either probable cause or rea-
sonable suspicion.206 Second, as with Kastigar, there is little evidence that 
trial courts are either able or willing to identify instances when officers 
lie.207 Finally, even if trial courts were to disbelieve officer testimony, the 
exclusion of evidence may not deter future misconduct.208 
Unlike Wardlow and Kastigar, Brady does not rely significantly on tri-
al courts to help ensure that its constitutional dictates are followed. Argua-
bly, however, the Brady Court’s belief that prosecutors would voluntarily 
turn over evidence that might hurt their ability to obtain a conviction was 
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obtained evidence had to be excluded from trial. Sarah Barlow, Patterns of Arrests for Misde-
meanor Narcotics Possession: Manhattan Police Practices 1960–62, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 549, 549 
(1968). 
 207 See Cloud, supra note 205, at 1356 (indicating that “judges may ‘wink’ at obvious police 
perjury in order to admit incriminating evidence” (internal quotations omitted) (footnote omitted)). 
 208 See supra notes 188–195 and accompanying text. 
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buttressed by its expectation that appellate review would help keep prosecu-
tors honest. Unfortunately, the Court’s decisions dictating the standard for 
appellate review of alleged Brady violations have undermined, rather than 
strengthened, the incentive for prosecutors to fulfill their Brady obligations. 
The Court in Bagley held that defendants seeking to reverse their convic-
tions must demonstrate that “there is a reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different.”209 By obligating defendants to demonstrate, not only 
that the prosecutor had failed to turn over evidence favorable to the ac-
cused, but that the production of such evidence was likely to have affected 
the trial, the Court greatly reduced the likelihood that appellate review 
would effectively deter prosecutors from ignoring their Brady obligations. 
D. Faith in Overlapping Sources of Protection 
It is possible that the Court’s faith in police and prosecutors is derived 
from all three sources—the character of the actors who operate the criminal 
justice system, the institutions within which they work, and the judiciary’s 
ability to supervise and discipline individuals and organizations that fail to 
follow the Court’s criminal procedure directives. Yet the very fact that there 
exist multiple justifications for the Court’s presumption that police and prose-
cutors can be trusted may, perversely, undermine the legitimacy of that belief. 
A number of scholars have highlighted the danger that overlapping 
sources for ensuring accountability can result in a diffusion of responsibility 
that invites abuse.210 Thus, although it is possible that institutional controls 
such as bar disciplinary committees, police internal review boards, and ad-
ministrative supervision might complement judicial oversight over rogue 
criminal justice actors, it seems equally likely that the multiple justifications 
for trusting police and prosecutors increases, rather than diminishes, the 
probability that police and prosecutors are ignoring their constitutional ob-
ligations. Indeed, the presumption that, except for “a few bad apples,” the 
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 210 E.g., Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce 
Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 91 (1995) (“The lack of enforcement may be 
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majority of prosecutors and police are of good moral character may explain 
the relative paucity of prosecutorial disciplinary proceedings and the per-
ceived failure of trial courts to regulate bad policing.211 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S MISPLACED FAITH 
If neither the individual nor collective explanations for trusting police 
and prosecutors justify the “faith” embedded in the Supreme Court’s crimi-
nal procedure decisions, then the implications of perpetuating these “Doc-
trines of Faith” are significant for the criminal justice system. Part III of this 
Article explores three questions.212 First, if the Court’s faith in police and 
prosecutors is misplaced, are the Court’s decisions that rely on those as-
sumptions particularly vulnerable to narrowing by lower courts?213 Second, 
what do these cases suggest about the value of diverse viewpoints on the 
federal bench?214 Finally, what does the Court’s reliance on the good inten-
tions of police and prosecutors means for the viability of court-led regula-
tion of police and prosecutors?215 
A. Questioning the Court’s Precedents and Their Application 
On a cold Boston evening on December 18, 2011, two police officers 
observed Jimmy Warren, a black male, walking with an acquaintance near a 
park.216 Believing that Warren and his companion fit the very general de-
scription of two burglary suspects, the two officers approached to investi-
gate, but before the officers could say more than, “Hey fellas,” Warren, 
much like Freddie Gray, ran.217 The officers pursued Mr. Warren, and, fol-
lowing a breathless foot chase, apprehended him after a brief struggle.218 
The officers recovered a gun on the property not far from where Mr. Warren 
was captured.219 Prior to trial, Mr. Warren moved to suppress the firearm 
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 215 See infra notes 274–282 and accompanying text. 
 216 Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 336 (Mass. 2016). 
 217 Id. at 338, 339 (recapping the interactions between police and the supposed suspects, char-
acterizing the description of the burglary suspects as “vague” and “bare-bones” and suggesting 
that it “contribute[d] nothing to the officers’ ability to distinguish the defendant from any other 
black male wearing dark clothes and a ‘hoodie’ in” the Roxbury neighborhood of Boston (citation 
omitted)). 
 218 See id. at 337 (providing a minute-by-minute account of the arrest). 
 219 Id. at 337–38. 
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and his statements arguing that the police lacked reasonable suspicion for 
the stop.220 The motion was denied and Mr. Warren was convicted of unlaw-
ful possession of a firearm after a short bench trial.221 
The trial court’s refusal to suppress the gun was unsurprising. Mirror-
ing the Supreme Court’s reasoning in its 2000 decision in Illinois v. Ward-
low, Massachusetts state law at the time described “evasive” behavior in a 
“high crime area” as relevant factors in evaluating reasonable suspicion.222 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, however, chose to examine the 
factual assumptions that lay at the core of the Wardlow reasoning.223 Citing 
a Boston Police Department report that documented a pattern of racial pro-
filing of black males in the city and statistics that black men were dispro-
portionally targeted for repeat police encounters, the court explained that, in 
light of current police practices, flight was “not necessarily probative of a 
suspect’s state of mind or consciousness of guilt.”224 Instead the court re-
versed the trial court’s finding of reasonable suspicion and stated that “the 
finding that black males in Boston are disproportionately and repeatedly 
targeted for [Field Interrogation and Observation] encounters suggests a 
reason for flight totally unrelated to consciousness of guilt.”225 
The 2016 Warren decision involved state law but notably its reasoning 
could easily be applied to Wardlow itself. The Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court did not eliminate flight as a factor in its reasonable suspicion 
analysis.226 Instead, the court recognized that the existing legal framework 
was open to incorporating new empirical evidence about how the police and 
                                                                                                                           
 220 Id. at 335–36. 
 221 Id. 
 222 See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (incorporating flight in a “high crime 
area” as a relevant factor for a stop based on reasonable suspicion); Commonwealth v. Depina, 
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the public interact.227 Although some trial courts may mistakenly assume 
that Wardlow created a simple test requiring only a finding of flight in a 
high crime area to establish reasonable suspicion, in fact, the decision did 
not set forth such a rigid calculus. As a result, both state and federal courts 
are free to incorporate a greater skepticism of the behavior of the police into 
their own cases evaluating reasonable suspicion. Taking their cue from 
Massachusetts, such courts would do well to consider recent reports detail-
ing widespread police misconduct such as the Department of Justice’s in-
vestigation of the Ferguson Police Department and a similar report detailing 
a pattern or practice of policing in Baltimore that violated the Constitution 
and federal law.228 
While the framework for the Wardlow decision allows lower courts to 
incorporate a less trusting view of the police into their analysis, the Su-
preme Court’s 1968 decision in Brady v. Maryland, appears less susceptible 
to reform. Even if courts were to adopt a skeptical view of prosecutors, their 
ability to ensure that exculpatory evidence is turned over remains limited.229 
Yet while the courts may struggle to identify Brady violations, they can do 
more to encourage prosecutors to fully satisfy their Brady obligations. 
The problem of prosecutors failing to turn over exculpatory evidence 
was exacerbated by the Court’s decision to limit the obligation to evidence 
that is deemed to be “material.”230 Lower courts, however, may have to 
shoulder some of the blame for the degree to which the materiality standard 
has enticed prosecutors to withhold potentially exculpatory evidence. In his 
dissent decrying the refusal of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to over-
turn a defendant’s conviction in spite of the prosecution’s failure to disclose 
powerful impeachment evidence for a key State witness, Chief Judge Alex 
Kozinski wrote, “By raising the materiality bar impossibly high, the panel 
invites prosecutors to avert their gaze from exculpatory evidence, secure in 
the belief that, if it turns up after the defendant has been convicted, judges 
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will dismiss the Brady violation as immaterial.”231 If lower court judges 
instead were to shift their calculus and require a stronger showing that the 
failure to disclose could not have impacted the outcome of the trial, then 
they might send the message Judge Kozinski hoped to convey: “Betray 
Brady . . . and you will lose your ill-gotten conviction.”232 
In addition to increasing the required confidence level for immateriali-
ty, trial courts, reluctant to simply trust prosecutors to “do the right thing,” 
might consider an innovative proposal by Professor Cynthia E. Jones to 
provide juries with an adverse inference instruction when prosecutors fail to 
meet their Brady obligations.233 
Generally, when Brady violations are discovered before or during the 
course of trial, courts order disclosure, and, if necessary, grant the defense a 
continuance.234 This remedy, however, does little to counter the powerful 
incentives prosecutors face to favor nondisclosure in close cases. Some 
scholars have suggested that judges should simply dismiss cases whenever a 
Brady violation occurs.235 Courts, however, have largely resisted such 
“drastic” sanctions and appellate courts have reversed some dismissals sug-
gesting that Brady violations should, whenever possible, be remedied with 
“less severe measures.”236 It may simply be unrealistic to expect that courts 
would regularly declare a mistrial when prosecutors fail to meet their dis-
covery obligations. Such a decision would surely test the resolve of judges, 
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who would be forced to decide whether to dismiss without prejudice, which 
would waste judicial resources and could disadvantage the defendant, or to 
dismiss with prejudice and perhaps allow a guilty party to go free. An ad-
verse inference charge, however, would allow judges concerned about pros-
ecutors’ failure to satisfy their Brady obligations to increase the pressure on 
prosecutors to disclose potential exculpatory information without requiring 
judges to expose themselves to reversal or to shoulder responsibility for an 
allegedly guilty party escaping justice. Moreover, an instruction hampering 
prosecutors’ ability to obtain a conviction at trial may be a greater incentive 
to fulfill their Brady obligations than the threat of a reversal from an appel-
late court years later.237 
Finally, courts can do more to determine whether the Supreme Court’s 
faith that prosecutors will reliably disclose favorable evidence to the ac-
cused is warranted. Some judges have suggested that “[t]here is an epidemic 
of Brady violations abroad in the land.”238 Despite this suggestion, there 
have been only limited efforts to develop systemic data about the scope and 
breadth of the disease. Although judges are ostensibly tasked with safe-
guarding the entire judicial process, their role is generally transactional; 
each case, and even individual discovery issues, tend to be viewed in isola-
tion and on a literal case-by-case basis.239 Yet, as Professor Andrew Manuel 
Crespo has noted, trial courts are in the position to gather a wealth of data 
about what is actually happening at the ground level of the criminal justice 
system.240 The Superior Court of the District of Columbia has already be-
gun to develop a database of “digitized Brady disclosures . . . through for-
mal electronic docket entries, informal emailed submissions to the ‘cham-
bers file,’ as well as digitally transcribed colloquies in open court.”241 Such 
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efforts expanded on the efforts of the public defender’s office in that juris-
diction, which had been compiling digital copies of witness testimony with 
digital annotations by its attorneys.242 By gathering system-wide facts about 
Brady violations, lower courts can effectively test the Supreme Court’s faith 
that “a prosecutor anxious about tacking too close to the wind” will reliably 
disclose exculpatory evidence.243 
As with Brady violations, trial courts and defendants are ill-equipped 
to identify instances when a defendant’s testimony induced under Kastigar 
v. United States has infected his or her trial.244 Nevertheless, by requiring 
prosecutors to commit themselves to certain safeguards in advance of trial, 
trial courts may be able to ameliorate some of the dangers posed by the 
prosecution’s employment of use and derivative use immunity. 
It was notable that the surprise announcement that the Baltimore State’s 
Attorney’s Office was dismissing the remaining charges against the officers 
charged in the death of Freddie Gray was made on the morning the court had 
scheduled the Kastigar hearing for Officer Miller.245 While the prosecution 
had established a “clean team” of prosecutors who ostensibly lacked 
knowledge of the compelled testimony, defense attorneys had been prepared 
to argue that the lead prosecutor had tainted the team by communicating with 
the clean team prosecutors as they prepared for trial.246 Indeed, Chief Deputy 
State’s Attorney Michael Schatzow, who was on the original prosecution 
team, denied the clean team was tainted, but he subsequently admitted that he 
had communicated with the clean team on multiple occasions.247 
Kastigar itself may have contributed to the defense and the prosecu-
tion’s disagreement over the propriety of the prosecutor’s communications 
with the clean team. Kastigar described the state’s burden as proving that 
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all of the evidence it proposed to use was derived from “legitimate inde-
pendent sources.”248 Left unsaid was the degree to which the government 
could use the coerced testimony for things other than deriving admissible 
evidence. While several lower courts have held that the government’s bur-
den is not simply to introduce independent evidence but to demonstrate that 
the coerced testimony has not influenced such things as trial strategy, the 
decision to initiate a prosecution, the plea offer, and a myriad of other non-
evidentiary issues, the prosecutor took a far narrower view of his Kastigar 
obligations.249 When asked about his discussions with the “clean team,” Mr. 
Schatzow simply stated, “There was no requirement that we not be allowed 
to talk to people.”250 
The Chief Deputy State’s Attorney’s statement is indicative of one of 
the failings of Kastigar and of one way skeptical courts can better protect 
defendants. Compelling testimony under Kastigar is surprisingly straight-
forward—prosecutors have no obligation to describe how they plan to uti-
lize the testimony or what safeguards they intend to employ to ensure that 
the compelled testimony does not adversely affect the defendant.251 Instead 
of asking prosecutors to give post hoc explanations for how evidence was 
derived, trial courts should, when possible, set forth clear expectations 
about the safeguards prosecutors are expected to adopt. Such safeguards 
could include physical restrictions on access to the recorded testimony, in-
cluding “records of persons to whom access was granted and the purpose 
for which the testimony was examined.”252 Any communication between 
individuals with knowledge of the testimony and the prosecuting attorneys 
could be recorded and provided to the court for in camera review. Moreo-
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ver, prosecutors should commit themselves to those safeguards prior to the 
issuance of an order to compel. Some scholars have suggested that the pros-
ecutor should be required to “swear that he has not had access to privileged 
testimony or to any information derived from it” when trying a witness who 
has previously testified under a grant of immunity.253 Although such a re-
quirement may be productive, pre-committing the prosecution to certain af-
firmative safeguards may be more effective at ensuring that compelled testi-
mony does not infect the defendant’s trial and that prosecutors are not tempt-
ed to cover for communications that may have created unintentional taint. 
B. The Need for Diverse Viewpoints on the Courts 
Ultimately, the Court’s Criminal Doctrines of Faith are grounded in 
empirical presumptions about how police and prosecutors behave.254 
Whether the Justices who authored those decisions premised their assump-
tions on their belief in the strong personal character of police and prosecu-
tors, the effectiveness of administrative checks on misbehavior, or the judi-
ciary’s ability to identify and deter misconduct, the question must be asked: 
Why did the Court believe them? 
One explanation is that the faith in police and prosecutors evidenced in 
the Court’s majority opinions was shaped, in part, by the Justices’ own per-
sonal and cultural experience with the criminal justice system.255 As United 
States District Judge Edward M. Chen has observed, “[J]udges draw upon 
the breadth and depth of their own life experience, upon the knowledge and 
understanding of people, and of human nature . . . inevitably, one’s ethnic 
and racial background contributes to those life experiences.”256 Because no 
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single or even primary cultural perspective exists, it is important not to “es-
sentialize” a particular community.257 But it is beyond debate that people of 
color experience the criminal justice system very differently than whites.258 
It is thus worth exploring whether a more diverse bench might produce a 
more balanced view of how police and prosecutors actually act.259 
Utah v. Strieff, decided in 2016, provides a striking example of both 
the advantages and the limits of seeking to improve judicial decision-
making by increasing the diversity of the bench.260 The author of the major-
ity decision, Justice Clarence Thomas, found that Officer Fackrell had 
simply made “two good-faith mistakes” and that there was “no indication 
that this unlawful stop was part of any systemic or recurrent police miscon-
duct.”261 Justice Thomas gives lie to the claim that a judge of color will 
necessarily incorporate the prevailing concerns of the racial group with 
which he or she identifies.262 Yet, Justice Sotomayor’s scathing dissent, di-
rectly challenging the majority’s faith in the motivations of the officer and the 
broader practices of police departments across the country, was shaped by her 
own personal perspectives as a Latina woman.263 Justice Sotomayor’s recog-
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nition that “suspicionless” stops were not a rare act of negligence, but rather 
the product of police training and deliberate strategy, challenged the majori-
ty’s view of how police operate in street encounters.264 Justice Sotomayor’s 
fresh perspective was not limited to her views on how police officers actual-
ly behave. Her dissent described the trauma that unlawful detentions and 
searches have on their victims, recognized the connection between the spe-
cific stop at issue in the case with the broader issues of racial profiling, and 
called attention to the perception that “black and brown parents” need to 
warn their children that the police may be a danger to them.265 
The Court’s lack of professional diversity may also contribute to its 
uncritical view of police and prosecutors. Since 1975, the number of former 
prosecutors on the Supreme Court has more than tripled.266 As of today, 
seven of the nine Justices have prior prosecutorial experience.267 Although 
those Justices with such experience undoubtedly bring a valuable practical 
perspective to the Court’s deliberations, “[t]heir experiences are all of apiece: 
years spent advocating with earnestness and vigor on behalf of the interests 
of law enforcement, in the always challenging struggle to contain and com-
bat crime.”268 In an editorial titled, “The Homogenous Federal Bench,” the 
New York Times Editorial Board decried the lack of professional diversity 
among federal judges, arguing that even under the Obama administration 
judicial nominees were “drawn overwhelmingly from the ranks of prosecu-
tors and corporate lawyers” and that “[t]his deprives the courts of crucial 
perspectives and reduces public trust in the justice system.”269 The Court, 
and indeed the entire federal judiciary, currently lacks judges who have ad-
vocated on behalf of those who have “seen policemen from the nightstick 
                                                                                                                           
that her decisions would be informed by her cultural experiences. See Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina 
Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92 (2002). 
 264 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“I do not doubt that most officers 
act in ‘good faith’ and do not set out to break the law. That does not mean these stops are ‘isolated 
instance[s] of negligence,’ however . . . . [M]any are the product of institutionalized training pro-
cedures”). 
 265 See id. at 2069–70 (detailing extensively the humiliations endured by the targets of “suspi-
cionless stops” and how entire communities are raised in the shadow of this police practice). 
 266 Andrew Manuel Crespo, Regaining Perspective: Constitutional Criminal Adjudication in 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1985, 1987 (2016). 
 267 Id. at 1995. 
 268 Id. at 2000 (citation omitted). 
 269 Editorial, The Homogeneous Federal Bench, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2014), https://nyti.ms/
1iwbG6b [https://perma.cc/4ZQ9-P2Q3]; see Elizabeth Warren, The Corporate Capture of the 
Federal Courts, 17 U. D.C. L. REV. 4, 6 (2014) (“According to a study published by the American 
Constitution Society, as of 2008, the federal appellate bench was ‘dominated by judges whose 
previous professional experience is generally corporate or prosecutorial.’” (footnote omitted)). 
2018] Criminal Doctrines of Faith 2255 
end.”270 Thus, it is hardly surprising that the doctrines shaped by those 
judges tend to reflect a lack of skepticism about the ways in which police 
and prosecutors behave. 
One need not accept Justice Sotomayor’s account in Strieff to recog-
nize that judicial decision-making is improved when a variety of voices and 
perspectives are included in the deliberative process.271 If the Court’s crimi-
nal procedure decisions have been marked by a bias in favor of police and 
prosecutors, part of the explanation and some of the solution likely lies in 
the diversity of the Court. A diverse bench ensures “that a single set of val-
ues or views do not dominate judicial decision-making.”272 To the extent 
that multiple perspectives challenge the benign assumptions the Court has 
traditionally made about the police and prosecutors, a more diverse Court 
may lead to doctrines that are more skeptical of the criminal justice system 
and more protective of civil liberties.273 
C. Losing Faith in the Courts 
For the last half century, the primary approach to regulating the crimi-
nal justice system and its actors has been to rely on the Constitution and the 
courts to establish threshold standards to prevent abuse.274 Some scholars 
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have suggested that the courts are ill-suited for this role and that, in the ab-
sence of judicial intervention, the other branches might have done a better 
job at curtailing misconduct.275 Several scholars have focused on the courts’ 
inability to develop flexible rules and their limited capacity to respond to 
rapidly changing circumstances such as when technological advances 
change the parameters of what law enforcement is able to do.276 Other 
scholars have challenged the courts’ “inaccurate empirical conclusions” and 
“flawed normative arguments about both rights and remedies.”277 Although 
there remains the hope that the Supreme Court will develop a more bal-
anced perspective, its historic inclination to assume the best of police and 
prosecutors may be further evidence that it would be beneficial if other in-
stitutions took on the difficult task of restraining criminal justice actors who 
abuse their discretion. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to attempt to describe what kind 
of rules and regimes the legislature and the executive branch might develop 
if they were to assume a more active role in policing the criminal justice 
system. Moreover, there remains the very real risk that placing a greater 
burden on the judiciary’s sister branches to curb misconduct will diffuse 
responsibility and result in even less effective oversight.278 It may be, how-
ever, that recognizing the courts’ persistent bias in favor of police and pros-
ecutors will help to counter the other branches’ tendency to cede responsi-
bility for police and prosecutorial misconduct to the judiciary. 
Given the underlying bias in the courts’ criminal procedure decisions, 
the judiciary’s most productive role may be one that prods the other branches 
of government to take responsibility for developing effective rules and sys-
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tems that will adequately protect the public.279 While the courts, for decades, 
have been viewed as setting the outermost limits of what police and prosecu-
tors may do, some have suggested that their most useful function has been to 
invite the other branches to more closely consider which policies they should 
adopt.280 The “politics of crime” may discourage politicians from attempting 
to curb police and prosecutorial abuses.281 When prodded to action, however, 
the political process may be more likely to uncover embedded biases and al-
ternative perspectives than the judiciary has been able to thus far. 
Should the Supreme Court, however, continue to play a substantial role 
in prescribing rules that shape police and prosecutorial behavior, the extent 
to which the Justices recognize and question the assumptions they make 
about how police and prosecutors behave will likely determine the effec-
tiveness of the safeguards they design. In many respects, this examination 
of the Court’s assumptions may have been what Justice Sotomayor was urg-
ing when she argued: 
We must not pretend that the countless people who are routinely 
targeted by police are “isolated.” They are the canaries in the coal 
mine whose deaths, civil and literal, warn us that no one can 
breathe in this atmosphere. They are the ones who recognize that 
unlawful police stops corrode all our civil liberties and threaten 
all our lives. Until their voices matter too, our justice system will 
continue to be anything but.282 
By questioning its faith in the police and prosecutors, the Supreme Court has 
the capacity to restore the public’s faith in both the Court and its doctrines. 
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CONCLUSION 
 The death of Freddie Gray, the subsequent federal investigation of the 
Baltimore City Police Department, and the battles between the States’ At-
torney’s office, the six defendants, and the officers who investigated the 
circumstances of Mr. Gray’s fatal injury suggest that the Court’s faith in 
police and prosecutors may be misplaced. Coupled with other high profile 
incidents of police and prosecutorial error and misconduct, the Freddie 
Gray cases indicate that the Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence is ripe 
for reconsideration. The Court’s failure to recognize that criminal justice 
actors do not always “do the right thing” is also evidence of the need for a 
diverse bench to ensure that such assumptions are effectively interrogated. 
Finally, the Court’s reliance on the good intentions of police and prosecu-
tors suggest that it may be dangerous to rely solely upon the judiciary to 
prevent police and prosecutorial abuse and that the Court’s most useful 
function may be to prod the other branches of government into taking a 
greater role in regulating law enforcement actors. 
